MatrixGame.E
defimported Lean
Expected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy x and Player II uses y.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable {๐ : Type} [Field ๐] [LinearOrder ๐] [IsStrictOrderedRing ๐] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ๐) in noncomputable def MatrixGame.E (x : stdSimplex ๐ I) (y : stdSimplex ๐ J) : ๐
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.E`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.E← MatrixGame.E (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGame.lean:89): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- MatrixGame.expectedPayoffExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy
xand Player II usesy. - MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i jโฆ
- MatrixGame.expectedPayoffExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy
- Used by 14
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs โ saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
X(A) ร Y(A)of optimal strategy sets iff it is a saddleโฆ - MatrixGame.E_eq_wsum_wsumHelper: writing
A.Eas an iteratedwsumexposes the structure that the saddle-point bounds rely on. - MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_zeroBridge lemma:
expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 0 = A.E (p 0) (p 1). Reduces both sides to the canonical double sumโฆ - MatrixGame.exists_strategic_game_nash_equilibriumThe strategic-game embedding of a finite matrix game admits a mixed Nash equilibrium. Combinesโฆ
- MatrixGame.image_optimalColumnStrategies_eqMatrixGame.image_optimalColumnStrategies_eq
- MatrixGame.support_complementarity_columnSupport complementarity (column). For an optimal pair
(xx, yy), every columnjwith positive probability underyyis a bestโฆ - MatrixGame.isMixedNashEq_of_purePure-strategy guarantees give a mixed Nash equilibrium. If
xxguarantees valuevagainst every pure column andyycaps the rowโฆ - MatrixGame.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_leA column strategy is optimal iff against every mixed row it caps payoff at the value.
- MatrixGame.expectedPayoff_toStrategicGame_oneMirror:
expectedPayoff A.toStrategicGame p 1 = -(A.E (p 0) (p 1)). - MatrixGame.IsMixedNashEqSaddle-point form of a mixed Nash equilibrium for a matrix game. For zero-sum two-player games, the standard mixed-strategy Nashโฆ
- MatrixGame.image_optimalRowStrategies_eqThe image of the row-optimal subtype set equals the H-representation polytope
A.optimalRowSet. - MatrixGame.E_eq_wsum_wsum_swapHelper: swap order of the iterated
wsuminA.E. - MatrixGame.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_geA row strategy is optimal iff against every mixed column it secures the value.
- MatrixGame.support_complementarity_rowSupport complementarity (row). For an optimal pair
(xx, yy), every rowiwith positive probability underxxis a best responseโฆ
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs โ saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable {๐ : Type} [Field ๐] [LinearOrder ๐] [IsStrictOrderedRing ๐] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ๐) in /-- Expected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy `x` and Player II uses `y`. -/ noncomputable def MatrixGame.E (x : stdSimplex ๐ I) (y : stdSimplex ๐ J) : ๐ := A.expectedPayoff x y