MatrixGame.IsEpsilonOptimalColumn
defimported Lean
An ε-optimal column strategy caps player I's payoff at value + ε.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in def MatrixGame.IsEpsilonOptimalColumn {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [ConditionallyCompleteLinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (ε : 𝕜) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.IsEpsilonOptimalColumn`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.IsEpsilonOptimalColumn← MatrixGame.IsEpsilonOptimalColumn (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:132): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- MatrixGame.valueThe value of a matrix game (
sSup-based; needs order completeness). Equal to both maximin and minimax by the minimax theorem… - MatrixGame.guarantee_IIPlayer II's guaranteed loss using mixed strategy
y: the maximum expected payoff (for Player I) over all of Player I's pure responses. - MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j…
- MatrixGame.valueThe value of a matrix game (
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in /-- An **ε-optimal column strategy** caps player I's payoff at `value + ε`. -/ def MatrixGame.IsEpsilonOptimalColumn {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [ConditionallyCompleteLinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (ε : 𝕜) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J) : Prop := A.guarantee_II yy ≤ A.value + ε