AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MatrixGame.IsEpsilonOptimalColumn

defimported Lean

An ε-optimal column strategy caps player I's payoff at value + ε.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
universe u in
variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
def MatrixGame.IsEpsilonOptimalColumn {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [ConditionallyCompleteLinearOrder 𝕜]
    [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜]
    (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (ε : 𝕜) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J) : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.IsEpsilonOptimalColumn`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 3
  • MatrixGame.valueThe value of a matrix game (sSup-based; needs order completeness). Equal to both maximin and minimax by the minimax theorem…
  • MatrixGame.guarantee_IIPlayer II's guaranteed loss using mixed strategy y: the maximum expected payoff (for Player I) over all of Player I's pure responses.
  • MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row i : I, Player II chooses column j : J. Payoff to Player I is g i j…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
universe u in
variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
/-- An **ε-optimal column strategy** caps player I's payoff at `value + ε`. -/
def MatrixGame.IsEpsilonOptimalColumn {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [ConditionallyCompleteLinearOrder 𝕜]
    [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜]
    (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) (ε : 𝕜) (yy : stdSimplex 𝕜 J) : Prop :=
  A.guarantee_II yy ≤ A.value + ε
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