MatrixGame.guarantee_II
defimported Lean
Player II's guaranteed loss using mixed strategy y: the maximum expected payoff (for Player I) over all of Player I's pure responses.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable {π : Type} [Field π] [LinearOrder π] [IsStrictOrderedRing π] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J π) in noncomputable def MatrixGame.guarantee_II (y : stdSimplex π J) : π
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.guarantee_II`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.guarantee_II← MatrixGame.guarantee_II (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGame.lean:112): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- MatrixGame.EiExpected payoff when pure row
ifaces Player II's mixed strategyy. - MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i jβ¦
- MatrixGame.EiExpected payoff when pure row
- Used by 12
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs β saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
X(A) à Y(A)of optimal strategy sets iff it is a saddle⦠- saddle_gap_low_value_symmetric_approx_nashLet n be a positive natural number with
[NeZero n]. Let A : Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) β be an n-by-n real matrix with entries in [0, 1]β¦ - MatrixGame.dualityGapPoint-wise duality gap at a strategy pair: the column player's realised loss-cap minus the row player's realised guarantee. Alwaysβ¦
- MatrixGame.optimalColumnStrategiesThe set of optimal column strategies: mixed strategies that achieve the minimax value.
- MatrixGame.IsEpsilonOptimalColumnAn Ξ΅-optimal column strategy caps player I's payoff at
value + Ξ΅. - MatrixGame.common_guarantee_eq_valueCommon guarantee gives the value. If both players guarantee the same scalar
w, thenwequals the game value. - MatrixGame.optimalRowSet_nonemptyMatrixGame.optimalRowSet_nonempty
- MatrixGame.mem_optimalColumnStrategies_iff_E_leA column strategy is optimal iff against every mixed row it caps payoff at the value.
- saddle_gap_guarantee_II_le_of_mem_optimalColumnStrategiesFor a positive natural number n, an n-by-n real matrix A, and a strategy x in
stdSimplex β (Fin n), if x is an optimal column strategyβ¦ - MatrixGame.minimaxThe minimax value: the best guarantee Player II can achieve.
minimax = inf_y sup_i E(i, y) - MatrixGame.optimalColumnSet_nonemptyMatrixGame.optimalColumnSet_nonempty
- saddle_gap_guarantee_II_eq_sup_sub_infFor a positive natural number n with
[NeZero n], an n-by-n real matrix A : Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) β, and a strategy vector x :β¦
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs β saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable {π : Type} [Field π] [LinearOrder π] [IsStrictOrderedRing π] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J π) in /-- Player II's guaranteed loss using mixed strategy `y`: the maximum expected payoff (for Player I) over all of Player I's pure responses. -/ noncomputable def MatrixGame.guarantee_II (y : stdSimplex π J) : π := Finset.sup' univ Finset.univ_nonempty (fun i => A.Ei i y)