MatrixGame.IsMaximin
defimported Lean
v is a maximin value of A: some row strategy guarantees at least v (existence), and no strictly larger value is achievable (maximality).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable {๐ : Type} [Field ๐] [LinearOrder ๐] [IsStrictOrderedRing ๐] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ๐) in def MatrixGame.IsMaximin (A : MatrixGame I J ๐) (v : ๐) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.IsMaximin`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.IsMaximin← MatrixGame.IsMaximin (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGame.lean:127): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i jโฆ - MatrixGame.EjExpected payoff when Player I uses
xagainst pure columnj.
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable {๐ : Type} [Field ๐] [LinearOrder ๐] [IsStrictOrderedRing ๐] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ๐) in /-- `v` is a **maximin value** of `A`: some row strategy guarantees at least `v` (existence), and no strictly larger value is achievable (maximality). -/ def MatrixGame.IsMaximin (A : MatrixGame I J ๐) (v : ๐) : Prop := (โ x : stdSimplex ๐ I, โ j, v โค A.Ej x j) โง (โ w, (โ x : stdSimplex ๐ I, โ j, w โค A.Ej x j) โ w โค v)