MatrixGame.Ej
defimported Lean
Expected payoff when Player I uses x against pure column j.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) in noncomputable def MatrixGame.Ej (x : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (j : J) : 𝕜
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.Ej`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.Ej← MatrixGame.Ej (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGame.lean:93): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - MatrixGame.payoffAgainstColumnExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy
xagainst pure columnj.
- MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
- Used by 14
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs ↔ saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
X(A) × Y(A)of optimal strategy sets iff it is a saddle… - EconCSLib.StrategicGame.MatrixGame.disp_EjColumn-side payoff under
disp A:Ej x j = (xA)_j − x_j. - MatrixGame.support_complementarity_columnSupport complementarity (column). For an optimal pair
(xx, yy), every columnjwith positive probability underyyis a best… - MatrixGame.IsPlayerIGuarantee
wis a guarantee for player I when some mixed row strategy achieves expected payoff≥ wagainst every pure column. Equivalent to… - MatrixGame.guarantee_IPlayer I's guaranteed payoff using mixed strategy
x: the minimum expected payoff over all of Player II's pure responses. A finite… - MatrixGame.IsValue
vis the value ofA(saddle-point form): there exist a row mixed strategyxand column mixed strategyysuch thatx… - MatrixGame.common_guarantee_eq_valueCommon guarantee gives the value. If both players guarantee the same scalar
w, thenwequals the game value. - MatrixGame.IsFictitiousPlayFictitious play realisation on a matrix game
A. At every stepn + 1, the row player picks a pure row best-responding to the column… - MatrixGame.optimalRowSet_nonemptyMatrixGame.optimalRowSet_nonempty
- MatrixGame.minimax_optimal_strategiesExistence of optimal mixed strategies: there exist mixed strategies
xxfor Player I andyyfor Player II and a valuevsuch that: -… - MatrixGame.IsMaximin
vis a maximin value ofA: some row strategy guarantees at leastv(existence), and no strictly larger value is achievable… - MatrixGame.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_geA row strategy is optimal iff against every mixed column it secures the value.
- saddle_gap_marginal_payoff_boundsLet n be a positive natural number. For any matrix A : Matrix (Fin n) (Fin n) ℝ with non-negative entries and any optimal row strategy σ…
- MatrixGame.optimalColumnSet_nonemptyMatrixGame.optimalColumnSet_nonempty
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs ↔ saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable {𝕜 : Type} [Field 𝕜] [LinearOrder 𝕜] [IsStrictOrderedRing 𝕜] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J 𝕜) in /-- Expected payoff when Player I uses `x` against pure column `j`. -/ noncomputable def MatrixGame.Ej (x : stdSimplex 𝕜 I) (j : J) : 𝕜 := A.payoffAgainstColumn x j