AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MatrixGame.value_eq_maximin

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

MatrixGame.value_eq_maximin

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
universe u in
variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
theorem MatrixGame.value_eq_maximin {π•œ : Type} [Field π•œ] [ConditionallyCompleteLinearOrder π•œ]
    [IsStrictOrderedRing π•œ]
    (A : MatrixGame I J π•œ) : A.value = A.maximin
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.value_eq_maximin`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 3
  • MatrixGame.valueThe value of a matrix game (sSup-based; needs order completeness). Equal to both maximin and minimax by the minimax theorem…
  • MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row i : I, Player II chooses column j : J. Payoff to Player I is g i j…
  • MatrixGame.maximinThe maximin value: the best guarantee Player I can achieve. maximin = sup_x inf_j E(x, j)
Used by 4

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open Finset BigOperators in
set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in
universe u in
variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in
variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in
theorem MatrixGame.value_eq_maximin {π•œ : Type} [Field π•œ] [ConditionallyCompleteLinearOrder π•œ]
    [IsStrictOrderedRing π•œ]
    (A : MatrixGame I J π•œ) : A.value = A.maximin := rfl
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