MatrixGame.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_ge
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
A row strategy is optimal iff against every mixed column it secures the value.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in universe u in variable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in theorem MatrixGame.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_ge (xx : stdSimplex ℝ I) : xx ∈ A.optimalRowStrategies ↔ ∀ y' : stdSimplex ℝ J, A.value ≤ A.E xx y'
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_ge`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_ge← MatrixGame.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_ge (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGameNash.lean:158): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 16
- MatrixGame.optimalRowStrategiesThe set of optimal row strategies: mixed strategies that achieve the maximin value.
- MatrixGame.valueThe value of a matrix game (
sSup-based; needs order completeness). Equal to both maximin and minimax by the minimax theorem… - wsumWeighted sum of
fwith weights from a simplex elementx. Thinabbrevover Mathlib's finite dot product⬝ᵥ: definitionally equal,… - MinimaxLoomis.lam.aux.bddAbove
lam.aux Ais uniformly bounded above on the simplex. - MinimaxLoomis.lam.auxPlayer I's guaranteed payoff from mixed strategy
x: the minimum over pure columns of the expected payoff. - stdSimplex.purePoint-mass simplex element at
i₀. - MatrixGame.EExpected payoff when Player I uses mixed strategy
xand Player II usesy. - MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - MatrixGame.value_eq_maximinMatrixGame.value_eq_maximin
- MatrixGame.guarantee_IPlayer I's guaranteed payoff using mixed strategy
x: the minimum expected payoff over all of Player II's pure responses. A finite… - wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
- MatrixGame.maximinThe maximin value: the best guarantee Player I can achieve.
maximin = sup_x inf_j E(x, j) - wsum_wsum_commExchange order of double weighted sums.
- stdSimplex.pure_applystdSimplex.pure_apply
- MatrixGame.EjExpected payoff when Player I uses
xagainst pure columnj. - ge_iff_simplex_ge
f ≥ vpointwise iff every simplex weighted sum is≥ v.
- Used by 4
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs ↔ saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
X(A) × Y(A)of optimal strategy sets iff it is a saddle… - MatrixGame.support_complementarity_columnSupport complementarity (column). For an optimal pair
(xx, yy), every columnjwith positive probability underyyis a best… - MatrixGame.image_optimalRowStrategies_eqThe image of the row-optimal subtype set equals the H-representation polytope
A.optimalRowSet. - MatrixGame.support_complementarity_rowSupport complementarity (row). For an optimal pair
(xx, yy), every rowiwith positive probability underxxis a best response…
- MatrixGame.optimal_pairs_iff_saddle_pointOptimal pairs ↔ saddle points. A pair of mixed strategies is in the product
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset BigOperators inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false inuniverse u invariable {I J : Type u} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] invariable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in/-- A row strategy is optimal iff against every mixed column it secures the value. -/theorem MatrixGame.mem_optimalRowStrategies_iff_E_ge (xx : stdSimplex ℝ I) : xx ∈ A.optimalRowStrategies ↔ ∀ y' : stdSimplex ℝ J, A.value ≤ A.E xx y' := by classical unfold optimalRowStrategies simp only [Set.mem_setOf_eq] constructor · intro hxx y' have hj : ∀ j, A.value ≤ A.Ej xx j := by intro j have : A.guarantee_I xx ≤ A.Ej xx j := Finset.inf'_le (fun j => A.Ej xx j) (Finset.mem_univ j) linarith [hxx] have heq : A.E xx y' = wsum y' (fun j => A.Ej xx j) := by show wsum xx (fun i => wsum y' (A.g i)) = wsum y' (fun j => wsum xx (fun i => A.g i j)) exact wsum_wsum_comm xx y' A.g rw [heq] exact (ge_iff_simplex_ge.mp hj) y' · intro h have hj : ∀ j, A.value ≤ A.Ej xx j := by intro j have := h (stdSimplex.pure j) have heq : A.E xx (stdSimplex.pure j) = A.Ej xx j := by show wsum xx (fun i => wsum (stdSimplex.pure j) (A.g i)) = wsum xx (fun i => A.g i j) apply Finset.sum_congr rfl intro i _ show xx.val i * wsum (stdSimplex.pure j) (A.g i) = xx.val i * A.g i j rw [wsum_pure_apply] rwa [heq] at this have hge : A.value ≤ A.guarantee_I xx := by show A.value ≤ Finset.inf' Finset.univ Finset.univ_nonempty (fun j => A.Ej xx j) rw [Finset.le_inf'_iff]; intro j _; exact hj j have hle : A.guarantee_I xx ≤ A.value := by have hmax : A.guarantee_I xx ≤ A.maximin := le_ciSup (bddAbove_def.2 (by obtain ⟨C, hC⟩ := MinimaxLoomis.lam.aux.bddAbove A.g exact ⟨C, by rintro r ⟨z, rfl⟩; exact hC z⟩)) xx have hv : A.value = A.maximin := A.value_eq_maximin linarith linarith