AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Mechanism.IsExPostIR

defimported Lean

A mechanism is (Ex-Post) Individually Rational if every agent gets nonneg utility from truthful reporting, regardless of others' reports.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in
variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in
def Mechanism.IsExPostIR [Preorder U] [Zero U] : Prop
Defined in
EconCSLib, `Mechanism.IsExPostIR`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • MechanismA (direct revelation) mechanism. - I — the set of agents (indices) - T — the type space of each agent - O — the outcome space A…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in
variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in
/-- A mechanism is (Ex-Post) Individually Rational if every agent gets nonneg utility from truthful reporting, regardless of others' reports. -/
def Mechanism.IsExPostIR [Preorder U] [Zero U] : Prop :=
  ∀ v : (∀ i, T i), ∀ i : I, ∀ r : (∀ i, T i),
    0 ≤ u (M.outcome (Function.update r i (v i))) v i
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