Mechanism.IsExPostIR
defimported Lean
A mechanism is (Ex-Post) Individually Rational if every agent gets nonneg utility from truthful reporting, regardless of others' reports.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in def Mechanism.IsExPostIR [Preorder U] [Zero U] : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Mechanism.IsExPostIR`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Mechanism.IsExPostIR← Mechanism.IsExPostIR (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/MechBasic.lean:101): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- MechanismA (direct revelation) mechanism. -
I— the set of agents (indices) -T— the type space of each agent -O— the outcome space A…
- MechanismA (direct revelation) mechanism. -
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in /-- A mechanism is (Ex-Post) Individually Rational if every agent gets nonneg utility from truthful reporting, regardless of others' reports. -/ def Mechanism.IsExPostIR [Preorder U] [Zero U] : Prop := ∀ v : (∀ i, T i), ∀ i : I, ∀ r : (∀ i, T i), 0 ≤ u (M.outcome (Function.update r i (v i))) v i