AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Mechanism.toStrategicGame

defimported Lean

The strategic game induced by a mechanism and a utility function. Each agent's strategy space is their type space T i (they choose what to report). Agent i's payoff from report profile r under true type tᵢ is utility (M.outcome r) tᵢ i. The utility function u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U takes: - the outcome chosen by the mechanism - the true type profile (for computing each agent's value) - the agent index This captures the standard setup: agents have private types, the mechanism chooses an outcome based on reports, and each agent evaluates the outcome according to their true type.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in
variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in
def Mechanism.toStrategicGame (v : ∀ i, T i) : EconCSLib.StrategicGame I U
Defined in
EconCSLib, `Mechanism.toStrategicGame`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
What was changed in Mechanism.toStrategicGame
--- EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/MechBasic.lean:85 (Mechanism.toStrategicGame)
+++ as compiled here
@@ -1,16 +1,6 @@
-/-- The strategic game induced by a mechanism and a utility function.
-
-  Each agent's strategy space is their type space `T i` (they choose what to report).
-  Agent `i`'s payoff from report profile `r` under true type `tᵢ` is
-  `utility (M.outcome r) tᵢ i`.
-
-  The utility function `u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U` takes:
-  - the outcome chosen by the mechanism
-  - the true type profile (for computing each agent's value)
-  - the agent index
-
-  This captures the standard setup: agents have private types, the mechanism
-  chooses an outcome based on reports, and each agent evaluates the outcome
-  according to their true type. -/
-def toStrategicGame (v : ∀ i, T i) : StrategicGame I U where
+set_option autoImplicit true in
+set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
+variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in
+variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in
+def Mechanism.toStrategicGame (v : ∀ i, T i) : EconCSLib.StrategicGame I U where
   strategy := T
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • MechanismA (direct revelation) mechanism. - I — the set of agents (indices) - T — the type space of each agent - O — the outcome space A…
  • EconCSLib.StrategicGameA strategic game (normal-form game) with players N and utilities in U. The structure records only the bare data: strategy spaces and a…
Used by 2
  • Mechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). A mechanism is DSIC with respect to a utility function if for every true type profile…
  • Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNashIf a mechanism is DSIC, then truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium.

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {O U : Type*} in
variable (M : Mechanism I T O) (u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U) in
/-- The strategic game induced by a mechanism and a utility function. Each agent's strategy space is their type space `T i` (they choose what to report). Agent `i`'s payoff from report profile `r` under true type `tᵢ` is `utility (M.outcome r) tᵢ i`. The utility function `u : O → (∀ i, T i) → I → U` takes: - the outcome chosen by the mechanism - the true type profile (for computing each agent's value) - the agent index This captures the standard setup: agents have private types, the mechanism chooses an outcome based on reports, and each agent evaluates the outcome according to their true type. -/
def Mechanism.toStrategicGame (v : ∀ i, T i) : EconCSLib.StrategicGame I U where
  strategy := T
  payoff r i := u (M.outcome r) v i
See it in the graphDiscuss this resultChallenge it