Mechanism
structureimported Lean
A (direct revelation) mechanism. - I — the set of agents (indices) - T — the type space of each agent - O — the outcome space A mechanism maps a profile of reported types to an outcome. In a *direct* mechanism, the message/preference space equals the type space, so agent i reports elements of T i. This is the most general definition. Specializations (auctions, voting rules, matching mechanisms) arise by choosing appropriate T, O, and utility functions.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in structure Mechanism (I : Type*) (T : I → Type*) (O : Type*)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Mechanism`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Mechanism← Mechanism (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/MechBasic.lean:62): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 6
- Mechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). A mechanism is DSIC with respect to a utility function if for every true type profile…
- MechanismWithTransfers.toMechanismViewing
MechanismWithTransfersas a generalMechanism. The outcome type isA × (I → P)(allocation, payment vector). - Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNashIf a mechanism is DSIC, then truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium.
- Mechanism.IsExPostIRA mechanism is (Ex-Post) Individually Rational if every agent gets nonneg utility from truthful reporting, regardless of others' reports.
- BayesianMechanism.toMechanismForget the prior and view a Bayesian mechanism simply as a mechanism on reported messages.
- Mechanism.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a mechanism and a utility function. Each agent's strategy space is their type space
T i(they choose what…
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in /-- A (direct revelation) mechanism. - `I` — the set of agents (indices) - `T` — the type space of each agent - `O` — the outcome space A mechanism maps a profile of reported types to an outcome. In a *direct* mechanism, the message/preference space equals the type space, so agent `i` reports elements of `T i`. This is the most general definition. Specializations (auctions, voting rules, matching mechanisms) arise by choosing appropriate `T`, `O`, and utility functions. -/ structure Mechanism (I : Type*) (T : I → Type*) (O : Type*) where /-- The outcome function: given all agents' reports, choose an outcome. -/ outcome : (∀ i, T i) → O