AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

Mechanism

structureimported Lean

A (direct revelation) mechanism. - I — the set of agents (indices) - T — the type space of each agent - O — the outcome space A mechanism maps a profile of reported types to an outcome. In a *direct* mechanism, the message/preference space equals the type space, so agent i reports elements of T i. This is the most general definition. Specializations (auctions, voting rules, matching mechanisms) arise by choosing appropriate T, O, and utility functions.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
structure Mechanism (I : Type*) (T : I → Type*) (O : Type*)
Defined in
EconCSLib, `Mechanism`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Used by 6
  • Mechanism.IsDSICDominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC). A mechanism is DSIC with respect to a utility function if for every true type profile…
  • MechanismWithTransfers.toMechanismViewing MechanismWithTransfers as a general Mechanism. The outcome type is A × (I → P) (allocation, payment vector).
  • Mechanism.IsDSIC.truthful_isNashIf a mechanism is DSIC, then truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium.
  • Mechanism.IsExPostIRA mechanism is (Ex-Post) Individually Rational if every agent gets nonneg utility from truthful reporting, regardless of others' reports.
  • BayesianMechanism.toMechanismForget the prior and view a Bayesian mechanism simply as a mechanism on reported messages.
  • Mechanism.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a mechanism and a utility function. Each agent's strategy space is their type space T i (they choose what…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
/-- A (direct revelation) mechanism. - `I` — the set of agents (indices) - `T` — the type space of each agent - `O` — the outcome space A mechanism maps a profile of reported types to an outcome. In a *direct* mechanism, the message/preference space equals the type space, so agent `i` reports elements of `T i`. This is the most general definition. Specializations (auctions, voting rules, matching mechanisms) arise by choosing appropriate `T`, `O`, and utility functions. -/
structure Mechanism (I : Type*) (T : I → Type*) (O : Type*) where
  /-- The outcome function: given all agents' reports, choose an outcome. -/
  outcome : (∀ i, T i) → O
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