AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

MechanismWithTransfers.toMechanism

defimported Lean

Viewing MechanismWithTransfers as a general Mechanism. The outcome type is A × (I → P) (allocation, payment vector).

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {A P V U : Type*} in
variable (M : MechanismWithTransfers I T A P) in
def MechanismWithTransfers.toMechanism :
    Mechanism I T (A × (I → P))
Defined in
EconCSLib, `MechanismWithTransfers.toMechanism`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. - I — agents - T — report/type space of each agent - A — allocation space - P — payment space…
  • MechanismA (direct revelation) mechanism. - I — the set of agents (indices) - T — the type space of each agent - O — the outcome space A…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {I : Type*} [DecidableEq I] {T : I → Type*} {A P V U : Type*} in
variable (M : MechanismWithTransfers I T A P) in
/-- Viewing `MechanismWithTransfers` as a general `Mechanism`. The outcome type is `A × (I → P)` (allocation, payment vector). -/
def MechanismWithTransfers.toMechanism :
    Mechanism I T (A × (I → P)) where
  outcome r := (M.allocationRule r, M.paymentRule r)
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