MechanismWithTransfers
structureimported Lean
A mechanism with monetary transfers. - I — agents - T — report/type space of each agent - A — allocation space - P — payment space The mechanism stores only how reports determine allocations and payments. Utility is imposed later, for example by quasi-linear utility or some richer domain-specific construction.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in structure MechanismWithTransfers (I : Type*) (T : I → Type*) (A : Type*) (P : Type*)
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `MechanismWithTransfers`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MechanismWithTransfers← MechanismWithTransfers (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/Transfer.lean:66): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 125
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
0gives payment0, holding the other reports fixed. - MechanismWithTransfers.isQuasiLinearExPostIREx-post IR for quasi-linear utility, as a specialization of
isExPostIR. - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_payment_of_allocation_eq_someThe allocated bidder pays the clearing price.
- SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - CombinatorialAuctionA combinatorial auction with
kdistinct items. This is a multiple-parameter mechanism whose allocation space is the type of… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongRevenueComparableRevenue optimality among revenue-comparable candidates.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuctionRegular Myerson optimality among feasible IC/IR mechanisms.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanismThe finite-allocation VCG mechanism induced by welfare maximization and Clarke-pivot payments.
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPayment_isDSIC_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2: a monotone allocation rule is DSIC when paired with the canonical Myerson payment rule.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
game reserve vequals the strategic game induced bymechanism reserve. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.integrableVirtualSurplusBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.integrableVirtualSurplus
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentityEx-ante virtual surplus agrees with the interim expression.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_difference_boundIf two payment rules implement the same allocation rule in DSIC form, then their difference along a one-dimensional deviation is…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toInterimFubiniBayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toInterimFubini
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueUpperBounded_of_isRevenueComparableBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueUpperBounded_of_isRevenueComparable
- MechanismWithTransfers.isExPostIREx-post individual rationality for a mechanism with transfers, relative to an externally supplied utility rule.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegIf agent
ireports truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then their quasi-linear utility is nonnegative against arbitrary reports by the… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasMyersonPaymentRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentityMyerson-payment revenue equals expected virtual surplus.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_payment_of_allocation_ne_someA bidder who is not allocated the item pays zero.
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasibleAllocation feasibility: each agent's allocation lies in
[0, 1]. RequiresZero R,One R, andLE R(e.g., any linearly ordered field). - MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGTransferMechanismThe underlying transfer mechanism of
VCGMechanism. This is the object to which the generic definitions inTransfer.lean, such as… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironmentExpected seller revenue of
B, evaluated in environmentA. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasible
- Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
game vequals the strategic game induced bymechanism. The payoffs agree becausepaymentRule b i = if i = winner b then b i else 0,… - Auction.SecondPrice.mechanismThe second-price auction as a
MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids inU(their type space is homogeneous:T i = U). -… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentInterimFubiniAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubiniBuild payment-side interim Fubini hypotheses from type-measure Fubini.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanismThe reserve second-price auction as a
MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids inU. The allocation isnonewhen the reserve is… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isFeasibleThe constructed auction is feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_interim_identitiesBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_interim_identities
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_isFeasible_of_aestronglyMeasurableFeasibility and a.e. strong measurability imply allocation integrability.
- MechanismWithTransfers.isQuasiLinearDSICDSIC for quasi-linear utility, as a specialization of
isDSIC. - SingleParameterMechanism.payment_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedUniqueness of zero-normalized DSIC payment rules: among zero-normalized payment rules, the canonical Myerson payment rule is the unique…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_of_expectedVirtualSurplus_leVirtual-surplus comparison gives revenue comparison under identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotoneKnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- MechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGameThe strategic game induced by a transfer mechanism and an external utility rule. Utility is supplied as a function of: - allocation -…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurableOnce the constructed allocation and payment integrands are measurable, boundedness gives interim integrability for the constructed auction.
- Auction.FirstPrice.mechanismThe first-price auction as a
MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids inU(their type space is homogeneous:T i = U). -… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- SingleParameterMechanism.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_payment_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(b): ifxis monotone, then there is a unique zero-normalized payment rule making(x, p)DSIC. - KnapsackAuctionA knapsack auction with public weights
w iand total capacityW. The underlying strategic object is aSingleParameterMechanism I U,… - SingleParameterMechanism.IsMonotoneMonotonicity of the allocation rule. Agent
i's allocation is non-decreasing ini's reported type, holding all other reports fixed.… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanismThe virtual-surplus allocation rule paired with its Myerson payment.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueUpperBoundedBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueUpperBounded
- SingleParameterMechanism.isMonotone_of_isDSICMyerson Lemma, Property 1: every DSIC single-parameter mechanism has a monotone allocation rule.
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedExplicit payment identity used in Myerson's Lemma: for a DSIC single-parameter mechanism with zero-normalized payments, the payment rule…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptionsFubini hypotheses connecting ex-ante and interim expressions.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.sellerRevenueSeller revenue at a report profile.
- SingleParameterMechanism.withMyersonPaymentThe single-parameter mechanism obtained by equipping an allocation rule with its canonical Myerson payment rule.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identitiesBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSICPointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand.
- MechanismWithTransfers.toMechanismViewing
MechanismWithTransfersas a generalMechanism. The outcome type isA × (I → P)(allocation, payment vector). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegularUnder regularity, the deterministic virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is monotone in the sense required by…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersView an incomplete-information single-item auction as the corresponding direct Bayesian mechanism with transfers.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueComparableBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueComparable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBoundExpected revenue is bounded above by expected virtual surplus.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_truthful_profile_quasiLinearUtility_nonnegThe same nonnegative-utility result for the fully truthful report profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_le_one_of_isFeasibleFeasible auctions have interim allocation probabilities at most
1. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBoundedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBounded
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalizedA zero-normalized payment rule has zero interim expected payment at type
0. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_identityBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_identity
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_allocationRuleAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrandPayment integrand for interim payment.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocationIntegrandAllocation integrand for interim probability.
- MultipleParameterMechanismA multiple-parameter mechanism with transfers. Here
Ais the type of feasible allocations andVis the codomain of valuations. Agent… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.intervalIntegrable_interimAllocProb_mul_virtualValue_mul_typeDensity_of_profileSplit_integrableProduct-side virtual-surplus integrability gives interval integrability of the density-weighted interim virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuctionBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_payment_le_bid_of_allocation_eq_someThe allocated bidder never pays more than her reported bid.
- MultipleParameterMechanism.VCGMechanism_isExPostIR_of_all_nonnegativeVCG satisfies the
MechanismWithTransfers.isExPostIRpredicate under the ambient assumption that every valuation in the unrestricted type… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptionsType-measure Fubini hypotheses.
- SingleItemAuctionA single-item auction. One indivisible item is for sale. Each agent reports a scalar bid of type
V. The allocation isOption I: -… - MechanismWithTransfers.isDSICDSIC for a mechanism with transfers, relative to an externally supplied utility rule.
- CombinatorialAuction.IsFeasibleFeasibility: each item is allocated to at most one agent.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubiniBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubini
- SingleParameterMechanism.IsImplementableAn allocation rule is implementable if there exists some payment rule such that the resulting single-parameter mechanism is DSIC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptionsAnalytic assumptions for MSZ 12.59.
- SingleParameterMechanism.quasiLinearUtilityQuasi-linear utility in the single-parameter setting:
uᵢ(θ, b) = θᵢ * xᵢ(b) - pᵢ(b). - MechanismWithTransfers.quasiLinearUtilityQuasi-linear utility induced by: - a valuation function on allocations - an embedding of payments into utility space - subtraction in the…
- SingleParameterMechanism.paymentThe payment vector induced by a bid profile in a single-parameter mechanism. This is just the inherited…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRuleAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentityExpected revenue equals expected virtual surplus.
- Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.mechanism_payment_eq_zero_of_allocation_eq_noneIf the item is withheld, every bidder pays zero.
- SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_of_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma, Property 2, reformulated: an allocation rule is implementable if it is monotone.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.hasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentityBayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.hasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentityBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentity
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_nonneg_of_isFeasibleFeasible auctions have nonnegative interim allocation probabilities.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible.isSingleItemAllocationRuleAuction feasibility gives allocation-rule feasibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironmentMyerson-payment revenue of
B, evaluated in environmentA. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRevenueComparableFeasible candidates with revenue equal to virtual surplus.
- KnapsackAuction.RespectsCapacityThe allocation rule respects the knapsack capacity constraint.
- MechanismWithTransfers.toQuasiLinearGameThe standard quasi-linear specialization of
toStrategicGame. - SingleParameterMechanism.isImplementable_iff_isMonotoneMyerson Lemma
(a): an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is monotone. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.RespectsSingleItemCapacityThe allocation rule respects the single-item probability budget.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_isFeasible
- BayesianMechanismWithTransfers.toMechanismWithTransfersForget the Bayesian prior and recover the underlying transfer mechanism on reported messages.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalThe allocation rule of the Myerson-payment mechanism is virtual-surplus optimal. This exposes the optimal-allocation content at the…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleThe allocation rule of the constructed Bayesian auction is ex-ante virtual-surplus optimal under the same explicit integrability…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRevenueUpperBoundedFeasible candidates with revenue bounded by virtual surplus.
- KnapsackAuction.welfareMaximizingMechanismThe canonical welfare-maximizing single-parameter knapsack mechanism, with payments given by the Myerson formula.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimal
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasibleICIRIntegrableFeasible IC/IR candidates with integrable virtual surplus.
- KnapsackAuction.natAuctionDataThe knapsack-auction data obtained from natural-number weights and capacity, with dummy zero allocation/payment rules. This is only used…
- SingleParameterMechanism.payment_formula_of_zeroNormalized_and_isDSICMyerson Lemma
(c): the unique zero-normalized DSIC payment rule from(b)is given by the explicit formula… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptionsPayment-side Fubini hypotheses connecting ex-ante and interim expressions.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPaymentInterim expected payment
m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.withPayment_isAllocFeasible_of_isSingleItemAllocationRuleA feasible single-item allocation rule satisfies
IsAllocFeasiblewith any payment rule. - SingleParameterMechanism.payment_sandwichFor a DSIC single-parameter mechanism, fixing all other bids yields the standard two-sided bound on payment differences.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongRevenueUpperBoundedRevenue optimality under the one-sided revenue upper bound.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalThe allocation rule of the constructed Bayesian single-item auction is virtual-surplus optimal.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in /-- A mechanism with monetary transfers. - `I` — agents - `T` — report/type space of each agent - `A` — allocation space - `P` — payment space The mechanism stores only how reports determine allocations and payments. Utility is imposed later, for example by quasi-linear utility or some richer domain-specific construction. -/ structure MechanismWithTransfers (I : Type*) (T : I → Type*) (A : Type*) (P : Type*) where /-- The allocation rule: given reports, choose an allocation. -/ allocationRule : (∀ i, T i) → A /-- The payment rule: given reports, determine each agent's payment. -/ paymentRule : (∀ i, T i) → I → P