MinimaxLoomis.exists_xx_lam0
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
There exists a mixed strategy xx whose column-payoffs all dominate lam0 A. Compactness + continuity gives a maximiser of lam.aux; that maximiser realises the supremum and beats every pure-column expectation.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset BigOperators in set_option linter.unusedSectionVars false in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in theorem MinimaxLoomis.exists_xx_lam0 (A : I → J → ℝ) : ∃ xx : stdSimplex ℝ I, ∀ j, lam0 A ≤ wsum xx (fun i => A i j)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MinimaxLoomis.exists_xx_lam0`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MinimaxLoomis.exists_xx_lam0← MinimaxLoomis.exists_xx_lam0 (EconCSLib/Math/Minimax/MinimaxLoomis.lean:114): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 7
- Loomis.lamB.aux.continuous
lamB.aux A Bis continuous on the simplex. - MinimaxLoomis.lam.aux.continuous
lam.aux Ais continuous as a function of the simplex point. - wsumWeighted sum of
fwith weights from a simplex elementx. Thinabbrevover Mathlib's finite dot product⬝ᵥ: definitionally equal,… - MinimaxLoomis.lam.auxPlayer I's guaranteed payoff from mixed strategy
x: the minimum over pure columns of the expected payoff. - wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
- Loomis.muB.aux.continuous
muB.aux A Bis continuous on the simplex. - MinimaxLoomis.lam0Player I's maxmin value (the row player's best guarantee).
- Loomis.lamB.aux.continuous
- Used by 2
- MatrixGame.minimax_optimal_strategiesExistence of optimal mixed strategies: there exist mixed strategies
xxfor Player I andyyfor Player II and a valuevsuch that: -… - MinimaxLoomis.lam0_le_mu0Weak duality for the two-player zero-sum matrix game: every maxmin value is bounded by every minmax value.
- MatrixGame.minimax_optimal_strategiesExistence of optimal mixed strategies: there exist mixed strategies
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset BigOperators inset_option linter.unusedSectionVars false invariable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in/-- There exists a mixed strategy `xx` whose column-payoffs all dominate `lam0 A`. Compactness + continuity gives a maximiser of `lam.aux`; that maximiser realises the supremum and beats every pure-column expectation. -/theorem MinimaxLoomis.exists_xx_lam0 (A : I → J → ℝ) : ∃ xx : stdSimplex ℝ I, ∀ j, lam0 A ≤ wsum xx (fun i => A i j) := by obtain ⟨xx, _, hxx⟩ := isCompact_univ.exists_isMaxOn (α := ℝ) (β := stdSimplex ℝ I) Set.univ_nonempty (lam.aux.continuous A).continuousOn rw [isMaxOn_iff] at hxx refine ⟨xx, fun j => ?_⟩ have h1 : lam0 A ≤ lam.aux A xx := ciSup_le fun y => hxx y (Set.mem_univ _) have h2 : lam.aux A xx ≤ wsum xx (fun i => A i j) := Finset.inf'_le _ (Finset.mem_univ j) exact h1.trans h2