MatrixGame.minimax_optimal_strategies
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Existence of optimal mixed strategies: there exist mixed strategies xx for Player I and yy for Player II and a value v such that: - Player I guarantees at least v: ∀ j, E(xx, j) ≥ v - Player II limits payoff to at most v: ∀ i, E(i, yy) ≤ v [MSZ Theorem 5.11, LRS Theorem 2.3.1]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open MatrixGame in open Finset BigOperators Matrix in variable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] in variable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in theorem MatrixGame.minimax_optimal_strategies : ∃ (xx : stdSimplex ℝ I) (yy : stdSimplex ℝ J) (v : ℝ), (∀ j : J, A.Ej xx j ≥ v) ∧ (∀ i : I, A.Ei i yy ≤ v)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `MatrixGame.minimax_optimal_strategies`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.MatrixGame.minimax_optimal_strategies← MatrixGame.minimax_optimal_strategies (EconCSLib/GameTheory/StrategicGame/ZeroSum/MatrixGame.lean:214): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 10
- Loomis.minmax_from_generalSimplified Loomis as a corollary of the general theorem: the finite von Neumann minimax
MinimaxLoomis.lam0 A = MinimaxLoomis.mu0 A… - MatrixGameA finite two-player zero-sum matrix game. Player I chooses row
i : I, Player II chooses columnj : J. Payoff to Player I isg i j… - MatrixGame.EjExpected payoff when Player I uses
xagainst pure columnj. - MatrixGame.EiExpected payoff when pure row
ifaces Player II's mixed strategyy. - MinimaxLoomis.lam0Player I's maxmin value (the row player's best guarantee).
- wsumWeighted sum of
fwith weights from a simplex elementx. Thinabbrevover Mathlib's finite dot product⬝ᵥ: definitionally equal,… - MinimaxLoomis.exists_xx_lam0There exists a mixed strategy
xxwhose column-payoffs all dominatelam0 A. Compactness + continuity gives a maximiser oflam.aux;… - MinimaxLoomis.mu0Player II's minmax value (the column player's best cap).
- MinimaxLoomis.exists_yy_mu0There exists a mixed strategy
yywhose row-payoffs are all dominated bymu0 A. - wsum_pure_applyWeighted sum at a point mass evaluates the chosen coordinate.
- Loomis.minmax_from_generalSimplified Loomis as a corollary of the general theorem: the finite von Neumann minimax
- Used by 2
- MatrixGame.optimalRowSet_nonemptyMatrixGame.optimalRowSet_nonempty
- MatrixGame.optimalColumnSet_nonemptyMatrixGame.optimalColumnSet_nonempty
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen MatrixGame inopen Finset BigOperators Matrix invariable {I J : Type*} [Fintype I] [Fintype J] [Nonempty I] [Nonempty J] invariable (A : MatrixGame I J ℝ) in/-- Existence of optimal mixed strategies: there exist mixed strategies `xx` for Player I and `yy` for Player II and a value `v` such that: - Player I guarantees at least `v`: `∀ j, E(xx, j) ≥ v` - Player II limits payoff to at most `v`: `∀ i, E(i, yy) ≤ v` [MSZ Theorem 5.11, LRS Theorem 2.3.1] -/theorem MatrixGame.minimax_optimal_strategies : ∃ (xx : stdSimplex ℝ I) (yy : stdSimplex ℝ J) (v : ℝ), (∀ j : J, A.Ej xx j ≥ v) ∧ (∀ i : I, A.Ei i yy ≤ v) := by obtain ⟨xx, Hxx⟩ := MinimaxLoomis.exists_xx_lam0 A.g obtain ⟨yy, Hyy⟩ := MinimaxLoomis.exists_yy_mu0 A.g refine ⟨xx, yy, MinimaxLoomis.lam0 A.g, ?_, ?_⟩ · -- ∀ j, Ej xx j ≥ lam0 A.g intro j -- A.Ej xx j = wsum xx (fun i => A.g i j) by unfolding payoffAgainstColumn. have : A.Ej xx j = wsum xx (fun i => A.g i j) := rfl rw [this]; exact Hxx j · -- ∀ i, Ei i yy ≤ lam0 A.g (using lam0 = mu0) intro i have : A.Ei i yy = wsum yy (fun j => A.g i j) := rfl rw [this, Loomis.minmax_from_general A.g] exact Hyy i