SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsParetoOptimal
abbrevimported Lean
An allocation A is Pareto optimal if no complete allocation B weakly improves every agent's bundle value and strictly improves at least one agent's value. [Fintype N] is required because IsAllocation uses Finset.univ.biUnion. [DecidableEq G] is required for Finset operations. [AGT Ch.12]
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N G : Type*} in abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsParetoOptimal [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsParetoOptimal`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsParetoOptimal← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsParetoOptimal (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/Efficiency.lean:47): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 5
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsParetoOptimalPareto optimal: there is no feasible allocation that weakly improves every agent and strictly improves at least one.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsAllocationA complete allocation partitions all goods among agents. *
disjoint: distinct agents receive disjoint bundles. *complete: every good… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.AllocationA fair-division allocation assigns each agent a share.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in…
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N G : Type*} in /-- An allocation `A` is Pareto optimal if no complete allocation `B` weakly improves every agent's bundle value and strictly improves at least one agent's value. `[Fintype N]` is required because `IsAllocation` uses `Finset.univ.biUnion`. `[DecidableEq G]` is required for `Finset` operations. [AGT Ch.12] -/ abbrev SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsParetoOptimal [Fintype N] [DecidableEq G] (v : Valuation N G) (allGoods : Finset G) (A : Allocation N G) : Prop := SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsParetoOptimal (fun B => IsAllocation allGoods B) v.val A