SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsParetoOptimal
defimported Lean
Pareto optimal: there is no feasible allocation that weakly improves every agent and strictly improves at least one.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N S : Type*} in def SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsParetoOptimal (feasible : Allocation N S → Prop) (u : N → S → ℝ) (A : Allocation N S) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsParetoOptimal`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsParetoOptimal← SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsParetoOptimal (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Fairness.lean:42): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.AllocationA fair-division allocation assigns each agent a share.
- Used by 2
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsParetoOptimalAn allocation
Ais Pareto optimal if no complete allocationBweakly improves every agent's bundle value and strictly improves at… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.CardinalInstance.IsParetoOptimalPareto optimality for a cardinal instance, using the instance feasibility predicate.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.IsParetoOptimalAn allocation
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N S : Type*} in /-- Pareto optimal: there is no feasible allocation that weakly improves every agent and strictly improves at least one. -/ def SocialChoice.FairDivision.IsParetoOptimal (feasible : Allocation N S → Prop) (u : N → S → ℝ) (A : Allocation N S) : Prop := ¬ ∃ B : Allocation N S, feasible B ∧ (∀ i : N, u i (A i) ≤ u i (B i)) ∧ (∃ i : N, u i (A i) < u i (B i))