AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfare_mono

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Utilitarian welfare is monotone: pointwise improvement implies welfare improvement. The valuation codomain is fixed to ℝ, so no ordered-algebra assumptions are needed.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open BigOperators Finset in
variable {N G : Type*} in
variable [Fintype N] in
lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfare_mono
    (v : Valuation N G) (A B : Allocation N G)
    (h : ∀ i : N, v.val i (A i) ≤ v.val i (B i)) :
    utilitarianWelfare v A ≤ utilitarianWelfare v B
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfare_mono`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
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set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open BigOperators Finset in
variable {N G : Type*} in
variable [Fintype N] in
/-- Utilitarian welfare is monotone: pointwise improvement implies welfare improvement. The valuation codomain is fixed to `ℝ`, so no ordered-algebra assumptions are needed. -/
lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfare_mono
    (v : Valuation N G) (A B : Allocation N G)
    (h : ∀ i : N, v.val i (A i) ≤ v.val i (B i)) :
    utilitarianWelfare v A ≤ utilitarianWelfare v B :=
  SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_mono v.val A B h
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