SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfare_mono
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Utilitarian welfare is monotone: pointwise improvement implies welfare improvement. The valuation codomain is fixed to ℝ, so no ordered-algebra assumptions are needed.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] in lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfare_mono (v : Valuation N G) (A B : Allocation N G) (h : ∀ i : N, v.val i (A i) ≤ v.val i (B i)) : utilitarianWelfare v A ≤ utilitarianWelfare v B
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfare_mono`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfare_mono← SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfare_mono (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/FairDivision/Indivisible/SocialWelfare.lean:119): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 5
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
i : Na bundle (a finite subset of goodsG). This is a plain function type alias. The partition… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_monoUtilitarian welfare is monotone: pointwise improvement implies welfare improvement.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.ValuationAn abstract valuation assigns a real value to each agent-bundle pair.
val i Sis the value agentiassigns to bundleS. Lives in… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfareUtilitarian social welfare: the sum of all agents' bundle values.
sw_U(A) = ∑_{i ∈ N} v_i(A_i). Maximizing utilitarian welfare produces… - SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_uniqueFor a unique agent, utilitarian welfare is just that agent's utility.
- SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.AllocationAn allocation assigns each agent
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BigOperators Finset in variable {N G : Type*} in variable [Fintype N] in /-- Utilitarian welfare is monotone: pointwise improvement implies welfare improvement. The valuation codomain is fixed to `ℝ`, so no ordered-algebra assumptions are needed. -/ lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.Indivisible.utilitarianWelfare_mono (v : Valuation N G) (A B : Allocation N G) (h : ∀ i : N, v.val i (A i) ≤ v.val i (B i)) : utilitarianWelfare v A ≤ utilitarianWelfare v B := SocialChoice.FairDivision.utilitarianWelfare_mono v.val A B h