AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.FairDivision.egalitarianWelfare_le

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

Egalitarian welfare is bounded above by each agent's utility.

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open BigOperators in
variable {N S : Type*} in
variable [Fintype N] in
lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.egalitarianWelfare_le [Nonempty N]
    (u : N → S → ℝ) (A : Allocation N S) (i : N) :
    egalitarianWelfare u A ≤ u i (A i)
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.FairDivision.egalitarianWelfare_le`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 3

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open BigOperators in
variable {N S : Type*} in
variable [Fintype N] in
/-- Egalitarian welfare is bounded above by each agent's utility. -/
lemma SocialChoice.FairDivision.egalitarianWelfare_le [Nonempty N]
    (u : N → S → ℝ) (A : Allocation N S) (i : N) :
    egalitarianWelfare u A ≤ u i (A i) :=
  Finset.inf'_le _ (Finset.mem_univ i)
See it in the graphDiscuss this resultChallenge it