SocialChoice.Voting.CondorcetWinner
defimported Lean
a is a Condorcet winner if it beats every other alternative by strict pairwise majority.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Classical in open Finset in open scoped BigOperators in variable {N A : Type*} in def SocialChoice.Voting.CondorcetWinner [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (a : A) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.CondorcetWinner`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.CondorcetWinner← SocialChoice.Voting.CondorcetWinner (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/VotingRules.lean:157): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.MajorityPrefersPairwise majority comparison.
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- Used by 2
- SocialChoice.Voting.HasCondorcetWinnerA profile has at least one Condorcet winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.CondorcetConsistencyA rule is Condorcet-consistent if every Condorcet winner is the unique winner.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Classical in open Finset in open scoped BigOperators in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- `a` is a Condorcet winner if it beats every other alternative by strict pairwise majority. -/ def SocialChoice.Voting.CondorcetWinner [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (a : A) : Prop := ∀ b : A, b ≠ a → MajorityPrefers P a b