SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Finset in variable {N A : Type*} in @[simp] theorem SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective {B : Type*} (rB : LinearOrder B) (f : A → B) (hf : Function.Injective f) (a b : A) : BallotPrefers (ballotFromInjective rB f hf) a b ↔ @LT.lt B (ballotLT rB) (f a) (f b)
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective← SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Basic.lean:96): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefersBallot
rranksastrictly aboveb. - SocialChoice.Voting.ballotFromInjectivePull a linear order back along an injective map, using the supplied codomain order explicitly rather than relying on ambient typeclass…
- SocialChoice.Voting.ballotLTBallot
r's strict-order instance, exposed explicitly to avoid ambient typeclass search.
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefersBallot
- Used by 96
- SocialChoice.Voting.votersPreferringVoters who strictly prefer
atob. - SocialChoice.Voting.MajorityPrefersPairwise majority comparison.
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoreCandidateTotal score for a candidate under a positional score vector.
- SocialChoice.Voting.finThreeRankOrderSocialChoice.Voting.finThreeRankOrder
- SocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoiceSocialChoice.Voting.topRank_eq_topChoice
- SocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_sizeSocialChoice.Voting.exists_nonempty_decisive_of_size
- SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetCycleProfileThe standard Condorcet cycle profile: voter 0 ranks
0 > 1 > 2, voter 1 ranks1 > 2 > 0, and voter 2 ranks2 > 0 > 1. - SocialChoice.Voting.betweenBallot_xzSocialChoice.Voting.betweenBallot_xz
- SocialChoice.Voting.PessimistStrategyproofnessPessimist strategyproofness for set-valued rules.
- SocialChoice.Voting.copeland_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.copeland_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.veto_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.veto_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.HasCondorcetWinnerA profile has at least one Condorcet winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IsDictatorAn individual is a dictator exactly when their singleton coalition is decisive.
- SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile_specSocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile_spec
- SocialChoice.Voting.pluralityPlurality rule.
- SocialChoice.Voting.topBallot_topSocialChoice.Voting.topBallot_top
- SocialChoice.Voting.unanimity_univ_isDecisiveSocialChoice.Voting.unanimity_univ_isDecisive
- SocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_of_ltSocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_of_lt
- SocialChoice.Voting.PrefersVoter
istrictly prefersatobin profileP. - SocialChoice.Voting.topBallot_preservesSocialChoice.Voting.topBallot_preserves
- SocialChoice.Voting.iia_strictSocialChoice.Voting.iia_strict
- SocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_iffSocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_iff
- SocialChoice.Voting.permuteCandidatesRelabel candidates by applying the inverse permutation to each ballot.
- SocialChoice.Voting.bordaBorda rule.
- SocialChoice.Voting.betweenKey_injectiveSocialChoice.Voting.betweenKey_injective
- SocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfileSocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile
- SocialChoice.Voting.vetoVeto rule.
- SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_neSocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.total_of_ne
- SocialChoice.Voting.marginPairwise majority margin: voters preferring
atobminus voters preferringbtoa. - SocialChoice.Voting.MonotonicityMonotonicity: raising a selected alternative cannot make it unselected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.IIAIndependence of irrelevant alternatives for SWFs.
- SocialChoice.Voting.CondorcetWinner
ais a Condorcet winner if it beats every other alternative by strict pairwise majority. - SocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile_specSocialChoice.Voting.modifiedForwardProfile_spec
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choiceSocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_insert_preserves_choice
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRuleGeneric positional scoring rule. The first argument is the number of alternatives, and the second is the zero-based rank.
- SocialChoice.Voting.ResoluteStrategyproofnessStrategyproofness for resolute rules: changing one ballot cannot produce a strictly better unique winner for the deviating voter.
- SocialChoice.Voting.TopRankCandidate
ais top-ranked by voteri. - SocialChoice.Voting.relabelProfileRelabel a profile along an equivalence of alternative types.
- SocialChoice.Voting.bottomKeySocialChoice.Voting.bottomKey
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers.total_of_neSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers.total_of_ne
- SocialChoice.Voting.acyclicBallot_specSocialChoice.Voting.acyclicBallot_spec
- SocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymmSocialChoice.Voting.Prefers.asymm
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.NonDictatorialA SWF is non-dictatorial.
- SocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.plurality_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.SimpleLift
Qis obtained fromPby weakly raisinga: anything belowainPremains belowainQ, and anything aboveainQwas… - SocialChoice.Voting.copelandCopeland winners.
- SocialChoice.Voting.borda_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.borda_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotBottomA linear-order ballot ranks
alast. - SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forwardSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_spread_forward
- SocialChoice.Voting.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for set-valued voting rules: no unanimously dominated alternative is selected.
- SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfileSocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile
- SocialChoice.Voting.unanimous_strict_pref_not_chosenIf every voter strictly prefers
atob, then a unanimous monotonic resolute voting rule cannot chooseb. This is the set-valued… - SocialChoice.Voting.positionThe 1-based position of
ain ballotr. - SocialChoice.Voting.betweenBallot_yzSocialChoice.Voting.betweenBallot_yz
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringWinnersWinners with maximal score.
- SocialChoice.Voting.exists_minimal_decisive_coalitionSocialChoice.Voting.exists_minimal_decisive_coalition
- SocialChoice.Voting.zKeyThe rank function used by
zBallot: first separate alternatives by membership inR, then use the relevant source ballot's rank. - SocialChoice.Voting.margin_selfSocialChoice.Voting.margin_self
- SocialChoice.Voting.OptimistStrategyproofnessOptimist strategyproofness for set-valued rules.
- SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.UnanimityUnanimity/Pareto for SWFs: unanimous strict preference forces social strict preference.
- SocialChoice.Voting.position_eq_rank_succSocialChoice.Voting.position_eq_rank_succ
- SocialChoice.Voting.margin_posPositive pairwise majority margin.
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringWinners_nonemptySocialChoice.Voting.scoringWinners_nonempty
- SocialChoice.Voting.relabelBallotRelabel a linear order along a permutation of alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.CondorcetConsistencyA rule is Condorcet-consistent if every Condorcet winner is the unique winner.
- SocialChoice.Voting.prefers_transSocialChoice.Voting.prefers_trans
- SocialChoice.Voting.betweenBallot_xySocialChoice.Voting.betweenBallot_xy
- SocialChoice.Voting.defaultBallotSocialChoice.Voting.defaultBallot
- SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_isDictatorSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_isDictator
- SocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveForSocialChoice.Voting.isWeaklyDecisiveFor_of_isDecisiveFor
- SocialChoice.Voting.betweenKeySocialChoice.Voting.betweenKey
- SocialChoice.Voting.rank
rank r ais the number of alternatives strictly aboveain ballotr. - SocialChoice.Voting.acyclicBallotSocialChoice.Voting.acyclicBallot
- SocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_reflSocialChoice.Voting.decisive_for_refl
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers.asymmSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers.asymm
- SocialChoice.Voting.NeutralityNeutrality: relabeling candidates relabels the winner set.
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveA coalition is decisive if it is decisive for every ordered pair of alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.topKeySocialChoice.Voting.topKey
- SocialChoice.Voting.topBallotSocialChoice.Voting.topBallot
- SocialChoice.Voting.BottomRankCandidate
ais bottom-ranked by voteri. - SocialChoice.Voting.topKey_injectiveSocialChoice.Voting.topKey_injective
- SocialChoice.Voting.strategyproof_monotonicStrategy-proofness implies monotonicity for finite voter sets. [MSZ 21.35]
- SocialChoice.Voting.ParetoEfficiencyAlias for voting-rule unanimity in its weak-Pareto form.
- SocialChoice.Voting.margin_skewSocialChoice.Voting.margin_skew
- SocialChoice.Voting.copelandScoreCopeland score: pairwise majority wins minus pairwise majority losses.
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotalSocialChoice.Voting.scoringRule_isTotal
- SocialChoice.Voting.top_unanimity_of_unanimityTop unanimity follows from weak-Pareto unanimity plus totality: if every voter ranks
afirst, thenais the unique winner. - SocialChoice.Voting.IsDecisiveForA coalition is decisive for
aoverbif unanimous strict support inside the coalition forces the social strict preferencea ≻ b. - SocialChoice.Voting.SWF.DictatorialA SWF is dictatorial if one voter always determines every strict social comparison.
- SocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorialSocialChoice.Voting.singleton_unanimity_dictatorial
- SocialChoice.Voting.betweenBallotSocialChoice.Voting.betweenBallot
- SocialChoice.Voting.relabelBallotEquivRelabel a linear order along an equivalence of alternative types.
- SocialChoice.Voting.rank_injectiveSocialChoice.Voting.rank_injective
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotTopA linear-order ballot ranks
afirst. - SocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRankSocialChoice.Voting.topChoice_topRank
- SocialChoice.Voting.IsWeaklyDecisiveForWeak decisiveness tests a coalition against a complement unanimously supporting the opposite strict ranking.
- SocialChoice.Voting.votersPreferringVoters who strictly prefer
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Finset invariable {N A : Type*} in@[simp]theorem SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective {B : Type*} (rB : LinearOrder B) (f : A → B) (hf : Function.Injective f) (a b : A) : BallotPrefers (ballotFromInjective rB f hf) a b ↔ @LT.lt B (ballotLT rB) (f a) (f b) := by rfl