SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile
defimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in noncomputable def SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (S T _U : Set N) (x y z : A) (hxy : x ≠ y) (hxz : x ≠ z) (hyz : y ≠ z) : Profile N A
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile← SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/Decisive.lean:345): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.acyclicBallotSocialChoice.Voting.acyclicBallot
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile_specSocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile_spec
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {N A : Type*} in noncomputable def SocialChoice.Voting.condorcetProfile [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (S T _U : Set N) (x y z : A) (hxy : x ≠ y) (hxz : x ≠ z) (hyz : y ≠ z) : Profile N A := by classical exact { pref := fun i => if i ∈ S then acyclicBallot A hxy hxz hyz else if i ∈ T then acyclicBallot A hyz (Ne.symm hxy) (Ne.symm hxz) else acyclicBallot A (Ne.symm hxz) (Ne.symm hyz) hxy }