SocialChoice.Voting.margin
defimported Lean
Pairwise majority margin: voters preferring a to b minus voters preferring b to a.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Classical in open Finset in open scoped BigOperators in variable {N A : Type*} in noncomputable def SocialChoice.Voting.margin [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (a b : A) : Int
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.margin`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.margin← SocialChoice.Voting.margin (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/VotingRules.lean:133): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.votersPreferringVoters who strictly prefer
atob. - SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.votersPreferringVoters who strictly prefer
- Used by 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.margin_selfSocialChoice.Voting.margin_self
- SocialChoice.Voting.margin_posPositive pairwise majority margin.
- SocialChoice.Voting.margin_skewSocialChoice.Voting.margin_skew
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Classical in open Finset in open scoped BigOperators in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- Pairwise majority margin: voters preferring `a` to `b` minus voters preferring `b` to `a`. -/ noncomputable def SocialChoice.Voting.margin [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (a b : A) : Int := Int.ofNat (Finset.card (votersPreferring P a b)) - Int.ofNat (Finset.card (votersPreferring P b a))