SocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_iff
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
SocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_iff
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Classical in open Finset in open scoped BigOperators in variable {N A : Type*} in theorem SocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_iff [Fintype A] (r : LinearOrder A) {a b : A} : rank r a < rank r b ↔ BallotPrefers r a b
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_iff`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_iff← SocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_iff (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/VotingRules.lean:99): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 6
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefersBallot
rranksastrictly aboveb. - SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_of_ltSocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_of_lt
- TotalPreorderA total preorder: a preorder where
≤is total (complete). This is weaker thanLinearOrder— it does NOT require antisymmetry or… - LinearOrder.toTotalPreorderEvery
LinearOrderis aTotalPreorder. - SocialChoice.Voting.rank
rank r ais the number of alternatives strictly aboveain ballotr.
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefersBallot
- Used by 1
- SocialChoice.Voting.topBallot_preservesSocialChoice.Voting.topBallot_preserves
Lean source view module on GitHub
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen Classical inopen Finset inopen scoped BigOperators invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.rank_lt_iff [Fintype A] (r : LinearOrder A) {a b : A} : rank r a < rank r b ↔ BallotPrefers r a b := by constructor · intro h letI := r by_contra hnot have hne : a ≠ b := by intro hab subst hab omega have hba : b < a := lt_of_le_of_ne (le_of_not_gt hnot) (Ne.symm hne) have hlt := rank_lt_of_lt r (by simpa [BallotPrefers] using hba) omega · exact rank_lt_of_lt r