AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

SocialChoice.Voting.topBallot_preserves

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

SocialChoice.Voting.topBallot_preserves

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
variable {N A : Type*} in
theorem SocialChoice.Voting.topBallot_preserves [Fintype A] (r : LinearOrder A) {y a b : A}
    (ha : a ≠ y) (hb : b ≠ y) :
    BallotPrefers (topBallot r y) a b ↔ BallotPrefers r a b
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.topBallot_preserves`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 9
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {N A : Type*} intheorem SocialChoice.Voting.topBallot_preserves [Fintype A] (r : LinearOrder A) {y a b : A}    (ha : a ≠ y) (hb : b ≠ y) :    BallotPrefers (topBallot r y) a b ↔ BallotPrefers r a b := by  simp [topBallot, topKey, ha, hb, rank_lt_iff]
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