SocialChoice.Voting.scoreCandidate
defimported Lean
Total score for a candidate under a positional score vector.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Classical in open Finset in open scoped BigOperators in variable {N A : Type*} in noncomputable def SocialChoice.Voting.scoreCandidate [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (score : Nat → Int) (a : A) : Int
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `SocialChoice.Voting.scoreCandidate`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.SocialChoice.Voting.scoreCandidate← SocialChoice.Voting.scoreCandidate (EconCSLib/SocialChoice/Voting/VotingRules.lean:172): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 3
- SocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjectiveSocialChoice.Voting.BallotPrefers_ballotFromInjective
- SocialChoice.Voting.ProfileA voting profile assigns each voter a strict linear order over alternatives.
- SocialChoice.Voting.rank
rank r ais the number of alternatives strictly aboveain ballotr.
- Used by 2
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringWinnersWinners with maximal score.
- SocialChoice.Voting.scoringWinners_nonemptySocialChoice.Voting.scoringWinners_nonempty
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open Classical in open Finset in open scoped BigOperators in variable {N A : Type*} in /-- Total score for a candidate under a positional score vector. -/ noncomputable def SocialChoice.Voting.scoreCandidate [Fintype N] [Fintype A] (P : Profile N A) (score : Nat → Int) (a : A) : Int := ∑ i : N, score (rank (P.pref i) a)