coalition_dominated_candidates
For finite candidate type C with decidable equality, voter type V, an election profile prof : V → LinearOrder C, a candidate a : C, and a finite set of voters S : Finset V, coalition_dominated_candidates prof a S is the Finset of candidates c in C such that there exists some voter v in S for whom (prof v).le c a.
Statement
def coalition_dominated_candidates {V C : Type*} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] (prof : V → LinearOrder C) (a : C) (S : Finset V) : Finset C
- Defined in
- arXiv:2610.26535, Section 2.2
- Verified
- 01 Nov 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 3
- in_regularized_plurality_veto_coreA candidate a is in the regularized plurality veto core at regularization strength ε if for every subset S of voters, the fraction |S|/|V|…
- in_regularized_plurality_veto_core_empty_coalitionFor any election profile, candidate a, and regularization strength ε, the empty set of voters satisfies the condition that its proportion…
- plurality_veto_inside_countFor a profile prof, candidate a and candidate set N, the veto inside count k(N) is the number of voters whose veto down-set below a (the…
Read back from the Lean
Given types V and C (with C finite and having decidable equality), a profile prof : V → LinearOrder C assigning a linear order on C to each voter in V, a candidate a : C, and a finite coalition of voters S : Finset V, coalition_dominated_candidates prof a S is the finite set of candidates c : C such that there exists some voter v ∈ S for whom c ≤ a according to the linear order prof v.
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- The set of candidates ranked weakly below candidate a by at least one voter in coalition S. -/ def coalition_dominated_candidates {V C : Type*} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] (prof : V → LinearOrder C) (a : C) (S : Finset V) : Finset C := S.biUnion (fun v => Finset.univ.filter (fun c => (prof v).le c a))