in_regularized_plurality_veto_core
A candidate a is in the regularized plurality veto core at regularization strength ε if for every subset S of voters, the fraction |S|/|V| is at most the sum over candidates c in coalition_dominated_candidates prof a S of regularized_plurality_weight prof ε c.
Statement
def in_regularized_plurality_veto_core {V C : Type*} [Fintype V] [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] (prof : V → LinearOrder C) (ε : ℝ) (a : C) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2610.26535, Definition 4 and Lemma 1
- Verified
- 01 Nov 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- coalition_dominated_candidatesFor finite candidate type C with decidable equality, voter type V, an election profile prof : V → LinearOrder C, a candidate a : C, and a…
- regularized_plurality_weightFor finite voter type V, finite candidate type C, a profile prof : V → LinearOrder C, regularization strength ε : ℝ, and candidate c : C,…
Read back from the Lean
Given finite types V (voters) and C (candidates) with decidable equality on C, a profile prof : V → LinearOrder C assigning a linear order to each voter, a real regularization parameter ε, and a candidate a : C, in_regularized_plurality_veto_core prof ε a asserts that:
For every subset of voters S ⊆ V (represented as a Finset V), the coalition's voter share |S| / |V| is less than or equal to the sum over all candidates c that are ranked weakly below a by at least one voter in S (i.e., ∃ v ∈ S, c ≤_v a) of candidate c's regularized plurality weight.
Here:
- The plurality score of candidate c is the number of voters v ∈ V for whom c is the top-ranked candidate (IsTop c under prof v).
- The regularized plurality weight of c is ((plurality_votes(c) / |V|) + ε) / (1 + |C| * ε).
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- Membership of candidate a in the regularized plurality veto core at regularization strength ε. -/ def in_regularized_plurality_veto_core {V C : Type*} [Fintype V] [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] (prof : V → LinearOrder C) (ε : ℝ) (a : C) : Prop := ∀ S : Finset V, (S.card : ℝ) / (Fintype.card V : ℝ) ≤ ∑ c ∈ coalition_dominated_candidates prof a S, regularized_plurality_weight prof ε c