in_regularized_plurality_veto_core_empty_coalition
For any election profile, candidate a, and regularization strength ε, the empty set of voters satisfies the condition that its proportion is at most the sum of regularized plurality weights of candidates it dominates.
Statement
lemma in_regularized_plurality_veto_core_empty_coalition {V C : Type*} [Fintype V] [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] (prof : V → LinearOrder C) (ε : ℝ) (a : C) : ((∅ : Finset V).card : ℝ) / (Fintype.card V : ℝ) ≤ ∑ c ∈ coalition_dominated_candidates prof a (∅ : Finset V), regularized_plurality_weight prof ε c
- Source
- arXiv:2610.26535
- Verified
- 01 Nov 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- coalition_dominated_candidatesFor finite candidate type C with decidable equality, voter type V, an election profile prof : V → LinearOrder C, a candidate a : C, and a…
- regularized_plurality_weightFor finite voter type V, finite candidate type C, a profile prof : V → LinearOrder C, regularization strength ε : ℝ, and candidate c : C,…
Read back from the Lean
For any finite types $V$ and $C$ with decidable equality on $C$, any profile prof : V → LinearOrder C assigning each voter in $V$ a linear order on $C$, any real number $\varepsilon$, and any candidate $a \in C$:
The cardinality of the empty finset of $V$ cast to $\mathbb{R}$, divided by the cardinality of $V$ cast to $\mathbb{R}$, is less than or equal to the sum over all candidates $c$ in coalition_dominated_candidates prof a ∅ of regularized_plurality_weight prof ε c.
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- The empty voter coalition satisfies the core condition for any regularization strength. -/ lemma in_regularized_plurality_veto_core_empty_coalition {V C : Type*} [Fintype V] [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] (prof : V → LinearOrder C) (ε : ℝ) (a : C) : ((∅ : Finset V).card : ℝ) / (Fintype.card V : ℝ) ≤ ∑ c ∈ coalition_dominated_candidates prof a (∅ : Finset V), regularized_plurality_weight prof ε c := by simp [coalition_dominated_candidates]