AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

empiricalJoint_row_deviation_le

theoremverifiedimported Lean

Row regret bound gives row deviation bound. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with row utility $u_r$ over $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, and consider $T > 0$ rounds of play in which the row player uses the mixed strategy $p_t$ and the column player the mixed strategy $q_t$ at round $t$. Fix $\varepsilon \in \bbr$ and a pure row action $i'$, and suppose the row player's cumulative external regret against always playing $i'$ is at most $\varepsilon T$: \[ \sum_{t=1}^{T}\sum_{j}(q_t)_j\, u_r(i',j) \;-\; \sum_{t=1}^{T}\sum_{i,j}(p_t)_i (q_t)_j\, u_r(i,j) \;\le\; \varepsilon T. \] Then in the empirical joint distribution $\sigma$ of the play, deviating to $i'$ gains at most $\varepsilon$ over the expected utility: $\mathrm{rowDevUtil}(\sigma, G, i') \le \mathrm{rowExpUtil}(\sigma, G) + \varepsilon$. This is the row half of empiricalJoint_isApproxCCE.

Statement

set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in
set_option autoImplicit false in
open Finset BigOperators in
lemma empiricalJoint_row_deviation_le {M N T : ℕ} (hT : 0 < T)
    (G : Game M N)
    (p : Fin T → MixedStrategy M) (q : Fin T → MixedStrategy N)
    (ε : ℝ) (i' : Fin M)
    (hRow : (∑ t : Fin T, ∑ j : Fin N, (q t).weights j * G.rowUtility i' j) -
        (∑ t : Fin T, ∑ i : Fin M, ∑ j : Fin N,
          (p t).weights i * (q t).weights j * G.rowUtility i j) ≤ ε * T) :
    (empiricalJoint hT p q).rowDeviationUtility G i' ≤
      (empiricalJoint hT p q).rowExpectedUtility G + ε
Source
TCSlib, `empiricalJoint_row_deviation_le`
Lean proof
By Karim Abdel Sadek, Mark Bedaywi, from github.com/Shilun-Allan-Li/tcslib at c8a02591b1e5 (Copyright (c) 2026 Karim Abdel Sadek and Mark Bedaywi. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.25.0.
Verified
07 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 9
  • JointDistribution.rowExpectedUtilityThe row player's expected utility under $\sigma$ in game $G$ is $\sum_{i,j} \sigma_{ij} \cdot u_r(i,j)$.
  • empiricalJointGiven $T > 0$ rounds of play in which the row player uses mixed strategy $p_t$ and the column player uses $q_t$, the empirical joint…
  • MixedStrategyA mixed strategy over $n$ actions is a record consisting of a weight function $w : \mathrm{Fin}\,n \to \mathbb{R}$ together with…
  • empiricalJoint_colMarginalColumn marginal of the empirical joint distribution. Consider $T > 0$ rounds of play between a row player with $M$ actions and a column…
  • empiricalJoint_rowDeviationUtilityEmpirical row deviation utility as a time average. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, and…
  • empiricalJoint_rowExpectedUtilityRow expected utility of the empirical joint distribution. Fix a finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, and…
  • empiricalJoint_rowMarginalRow marginal of the empirical joint distribution. Fix $T \ge 1$ rounds of play in which the row player uses mixed strategies…
  • GameA finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, specified by a row utility function…
  • JointDistribution.rowDeviationUtilityThe row player's expected utility from unilaterally deviating to the fixed pure action $i'$, while the column player keeps $\sigma$'s…
Used by 1
  • empiricalJoint_isApproxCCENo-regret play yields an approximate coarse correlated equilibrium. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with row utility $u_r$ and column…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false inset_option autoImplicit false inopen Finset BigOperators in/-- Row half of `empiricalJoint_isApproxCCE`: if the row player's cumulative external regret against the fixed deviation `i'` (the cumulative utility of always playing `i'` minus the actual cumulative expected utility) is at most `ε · T`, then in the empirical joint distribution deviating to `i'` gains at most `ε` over the expected utility. [Rou13-L17, Prop. 3.1]; [CBL06, §7.4]. **Proof sketch.** Step 1: rewrite both empirical utilities as time averages (`empiricalJoint_rowDeviationUtility`, `empiricalJoint_rowExpectedUtility`). Step 2: put the right-hand side over the common denominator `T`. Step 3: clear `T > 0` from both sides; the resulting inequality is the regret hypothesis. -/lemma empiricalJoint_row_deviation_le {M N T : ℕ} (hT : 0 < T)    (G : Game M N)    (p : Fin T → MixedStrategy M) (q : Fin T → MixedStrategy N)    (ε : ℝ) (i' : Fin M)    (hRow : (∑ t : Fin T, ∑ j : Fin N, (q t).weights j * G.rowUtility i' j) -        (∑ t : Fin T, ∑ i : Fin M, ∑ j : Fin N,          (p t).weights i * (q t).weights j * G.rowUtility i j) ≤ ε * T) :    (empiricalJoint hT p q).rowDeviationUtility G i' ≤      (empiricalJoint hT p q).rowExpectedUtility G + ε := by  have hT_pos : (0 : ℝ) < (T : ℝ) := Nat.cast_pos.mpr hT  have hT_ne : (T : ℝ) ≠ 0 := ne_of_gt hT_pos  -- Step 1: rewrite both empirical utilities as time averages.  rw [empiricalJoint_rowDeviationUtility, empiricalJoint_rowExpectedUtility]  -- Step 2: put the right-hand side over the common denominator `T`.  have hRHS :      (∑ t : Fin T, ∑ i : Fin M, ∑ j : Fin N,          (p t).weights i * (q t).weights j * G.rowUtility i j) / (T : ℝ) +        ε =        ((∑ t : Fin T, ∑ i : Fin M, ∑ j : Fin N,          (p t).weights i * (q t).weights j * G.rowUtility i j) +          ε * (T : ℝ)) / (T : ℝ) := by field_simp  -- Step 3: clear `T` and conclude from the regret bound.  rw [hRHS, div_le_div_iff₀ hT_pos hT_pos]  nlinarith [hRow, hT_pos]
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