AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

empiricalJoint_colDeviationUtility

theoremverifiedimported Lean

Column deviation utility of the empirical joint distribution. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions and column utility $u_c(i,j)$, and fix a number of rounds $T \ge 1$. Suppose that in each round $t \in \{1,\dots,T\}$ the row player plays a mixed strategy $p_t$ over the $M$ row actions and the column player plays a mixed strategy $q_t$ over the $N$ column actions, and let $\sigma$ be the empirical joint distribution that assigns mass $\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T} (p_t)_i\,(q_t)_j$ to each action profile $(i,j)$. Then, for every column action $j'$, the column player's expected utility from deviating to the pure action $j'$ against the row marginal $\sigma^{\mathrm{row}}_i = \sum_{j} \sigma_{ij}$ is the time average of the round-by-round deviation utilities: \[ \sum_{i} \sigma^{\mathrm{row}}_i\, u_c(i,j') = \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T}\sum_{i} (p_t)_i\, u_c(i,j'). \]

Statement

set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false in
set_option autoImplicit false in
open Finset BigOperators in
lemma empiricalJoint_colDeviationUtility {M N T : ℕ} (hT : 0 < T)
    (p : Fin T → MixedStrategy M) (q : Fin T → MixedStrategy N) (G : Game M N)
    (j' : Fin N) :
    (empiricalJoint hT p q).colDeviationUtility G j' =
      (∑ t : Fin T, ∑ i : Fin M, (p t).weights i * G.colUtility i j') / T
Source
TCSlib, `empiricalJoint_colDeviationUtility`
Lean proof
By Karim Abdel Sadek, Mark Bedaywi, from github.com/Shilun-Allan-Li/tcslib at c8a02591b1e5 (Copyright (c) 2026 Karim Abdel Sadek and Mark Bedaywi. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.25.0.
Verified
07 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 6
  • empiricalJointGiven $T > 0$ rounds of play in which the row player uses mixed strategy $p_t$ and the column player uses $q_t$, the empirical joint…
  • MixedStrategyA mixed strategy over $n$ actions is a record consisting of a weight function $w : \mathrm{Fin}\,n \to \mathbb{R}$ together with…
  • JointDistribution.colDeviationUtilityThe column player's expected utility from unilaterally deviating to the fixed pure action $j'$, while the row player keeps $\sigma$'s row…
  • empiricalJoint_colMarginalColumn marginal of the empirical joint distribution. Consider $T > 0$ rounds of play between a row player with $M$ actions and a column…
  • empiricalJoint_rowMarginalRow marginal of the empirical joint distribution. Fix $T \ge 1$ rounds of play in which the row player uses mixed strategies…
  • GameA finite two-player game with $M$ row actions and $N$ column actions, specified by a row utility function…
Used by 1
  • empiricalJoint_col_deviation_leColumn regret bound gives column deviation bound. Let $G$ be a finite two-player game with column utility $u_c$ over $M$ row actions and…

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option relaxedAutoImplicit false inset_option autoImplicit false inopen Finset BigOperators in/-- The column player's deviation utility in the empirical joint distribution is the time average `(1/T) Σ_t Σ_i p_t(i) v(i, j')` of the utility of always playing the fixed column action `j'` against the row strategies actually played. -/lemma empiricalJoint_colDeviationUtility {M N T : ℕ} (hT : 0 < T)    (p : Fin T → MixedStrategy M) (q : Fin T → MixedStrategy N) (G : Game M N)    (j' : Fin N) :    (empiricalJoint hT p q).colDeviationUtility G j' =      (∑ t : Fin T, ∑ i : Fin M, (p t).weights i * G.colUtility i j') / T := by  unfold JointDistribution.colDeviationUtility  simp_rw [empiricalJoint_rowMarginal]  have hStep : ∀ i : Fin M,      (∑ t : Fin T, (p t).weights i) / (T : ℝ) * G.colUtility i j' =        (∑ t : Fin T, (p t).weights i * G.colUtility i j') / (T : ℝ) := by    intro i    rw [div_mul_eq_mul_div, ← Finset.sum_mul]  simp_rw [hStep]  rw [← Finset.sum_div, Finset.sum_comm]
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