AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

fse_SP

def

Strategyproofness for the scaling function q: no agent can lower her scaled cost by misreporting her location (any misreport in [0,1]).

Statement

def fse_SP {n : ℕ} (q : ℝ → ℝ) (f : (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ) : Prop
Defined in
Facility Location Games with Scaling Effects (arXiv:2402.18908v3), Section 2, Theorem 4 and the concluding conjecture that the deterministic strategyproof and surjective mechanisms under scaled preferences are dictatorships; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-05
Verified
05 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 2
  • fse_costFacility location with scaling effects (arXiv 2402.18908): an agent located at x incurs cost q y * |x - y| when the facility is placed at…
  • fse_InDomainA location profile of n agents lies in the domain [0,1].
Used by 5
  • fse_leftmost_SP_of_antitoneKey lemma: for every scaling function that is non-negative and non-increasing on [0,1], the leftmost mechanism is strategyproof.
  • fse_conjecture_false_qdepRefutation in the model with the scaling function as input. The mechanism fse_F (which receives q) is strategyproof and surjective for…
  • fse_SPAllA scaling-oblivious mechanism is strategyproof for *every* scaling function: the mechanism does not know q, and no agent can gain under…
  • fse_dictatorship_conjecture_falseRefutation of the dictatorship conjecture of arXiv 2402.18908 (Section 8). For every number n ≥ 2 of agents there is a scaling function…
  • fse_dictator_SPA dictatorship is strategyproof for every non-negative scaling function.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- Strategyproofness for the scaling function `q`: no agent can lower her scaled cost by misreporting her location (any misreport in `[0,1]`). -/
def fse_SP {n : ℕ} (q : ℝ → ℝ) (f : (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ) : Prop :=
  ∀ x : Fin n → ℝ, fse_InDomain x → ∀ i : Fin n, ∀ x' : ℝ, x' ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1 →
    fse_cost q (f x) (x i) ≤ fse_cost q (f (Function.update x i x')) (x i)
See it in the graphDiscuss this resultChallenge it