fse_SP
def
Strategyproofness for the scaling function q: no agent can lower her scaled cost by misreporting her location (any misreport in [0,1]).
Statement
def fse_SP {n : ℕ} (q : ℝ → ℝ) (f : (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- Facility Location Games with Scaling Effects (arXiv:2402.18908v3), Section 2, Theorem 4 and the concluding conjecture that the deterministic strategyproof and surjective mechanisms under scaled preferences are dictatorships; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-05
- Verified
- 05 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- fse_costFacility location with scaling effects (arXiv 2402.18908): an agent located at x incurs cost q y * |x - y| when the facility is placed at…
- fse_InDomainA location profile of n agents lies in the domain [0,1].
- Used by 5
- fse_leftmost_SP_of_antitoneKey lemma: for every scaling function that is non-negative and non-increasing on [0,1], the leftmost mechanism is strategyproof.
- fse_conjecture_false_qdepRefutation in the model with the scaling function as input. The mechanism fse_F (which receives q) is strategyproof and surjective for…
- fse_SPAllA scaling-oblivious mechanism is strategyproof for *every* scaling function: the mechanism does not know q, and no agent can gain under…
- fse_dictatorship_conjecture_falseRefutation of the dictatorship conjecture of arXiv 2402.18908 (Section 8). For every number n ≥ 2 of agents there is a scaling function…
- fse_dictator_SPA dictatorship is strategyproof for every non-negative scaling function.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- Strategyproofness for the scaling function `q`: no agent can lower her scaled cost by misreporting her location (any misreport in `[0,1]`). -/ def fse_SP {n : ℕ} (q : ℝ → ℝ) (f : (Fin n → ℝ) → ℝ) : Prop := ∀ x : Fin n → ℝ, fse_InDomain x → ∀ i : Fin n, ∀ x' : ℝ, x' ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1 → fse_cost q (f x) (x i) ≤ fse_cost q (f (Function.update x i x')) (x i)