AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

is_ef1_rule

def

Given types Agent and Object with decidable equality on Object, a rule f : (Agent → LinearOrder Object) → Agent → Finset Object satisfies is_ef1_rule if for every preference profile succ : Agent → LinearOrder Object and all agents i j : Agent, there exists a subset S of bundle f succ j with cardinality at most 1 such that bundle f succ i pairwise-dominates f succ j \ S under (succ i).le.

Statement

def is_ef1_rule {Agent Object : Type*} [DecidableEq Object] (f : (Agent → LinearOrder Object) → Agent → Finset Object) : Prop
Defined in
arXiv:2611.09685 Section 3 (p. 8)
Verified
09 Nov 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • pairwise_dominatesA finite bundle S : Finset α pairwise-dominates a finite bundle S' : Finset α for an agent with weak preference relation le : α → α → Prop…
Used by 1

Read back from the Lean

Given types Agent and Object with decidable equality on Object, and an allocation function f taking a preference profile succ : Agent → LinearOrder Object and an agent to a Finset Object, is_ef1_rule f asserts: For every preference profile succ : Agent → LinearOrder Object and all agents i, j : Agent, there exists a subset S ⊆ f succ j of cardinality at most 1 such that f succ i pairwise dominates f succ j \ S with respect to agent i's linear order (succ i).le.

Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.

Lean source view module on GitHub

/-- A social choice rule satisfies EF1 if at every preference profile, for any two agents i and j, agent i does not envy j's bundle after removing at most one object, under pairwise dominance. -/
def is_ef1_rule {Agent Object : Type*} [DecidableEq Object] (f : (Agent → LinearOrder Object) → Agent → Finset Object) : Prop := ∀ (succ : Agent → LinearOrder Object) (i j : Agent), ∃ S ⊆ f succ j, S.card ≤ 1 ∧ pairwise_dominates (succ i).le (f succ i) (f succ j \ S)
See it in the graphDiscuss this resultChallenge it