pairwise_dominates
def
A finite bundle S : Finset α pairwise-dominates a finite bundle S' : Finset α for an agent with weak preference relation le : α → α → Prop if there is an injection f : α → α mapping each element y of S' into S such that le y (f y) holds.
Statement
def pairwise_dominates {α : Type*} (le : α → α → Prop) (S S' : Finset α) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2611.09685 Section 2.2
- Verified
- 09 Nov 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 3
- bundle_card_bounds_of_ef1_non_wastefulFor any allocation rule on n agents and k * n + r objects that is non-wasteful and EF1, every agent receives either k or k + 1 objects…
- is_weakly_strategy_proof_ruleA social choice rule f is weakly strategy-proof if for every preference profile succ, every agent i, and every alternative linear order…
- is_ef1_ruleGiven types Agent and Object with decidable equality on Object, a rule f : (Agent → LinearOrder Object) → Agent → Finset Object satisfies…
Read back from the Lean
Given a type α, a binary relation le : α → α → Prop, and two finite subsets S, S' : Finset α, pairwise_dominates le S S' asserts that there exists a function f : α → α such that:
1. For every y ∈ S', f y ∈ S;
2. For all y₁, y₂ ∈ S', if f y₁ = f y₂, then y₁ = y₂ (i.e., f is injective when restricted to S'); and
3. For every y ∈ S', le y (f y) holds.
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- Pairwise dominance of finite bundle S over finite bundle S' under item preference relation le. -/ def pairwise_dominates {α : Type*} (le : α → α → Prop) (S S' : Finset α) : Prop := ∃ (f : α → α), (∀ y ∈ S', f y ∈ S) ∧ (∀ y₁ ∈ S', ∀ y₂ ∈ S', f y₁ = f y₂ → y₁ = y₂) ∧ ∀ y ∈ S', le y (f y)