is_weakly_strategy_proof_rule
A social choice rule f is weakly strategy-proof if for every preference profile succ, every agent i, and every alternative linear order succ'_i, the bundle f (Function.update succ i succ'_i) i that agent i receives under the unilateral misreport does not strictly pairwise-dominate i's truthful bundle f succ i under i's true preference order.
Statement
def is_weakly_strategy_proof_rule {Agent Object : Type*} [DecidableEq Agent] (f : (Agent → LinearOrder Object) → Agent → Finset Object) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2611.09685 Section 5 (p. 14)
- Verified
- 09 Nov 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- pairwise_dominatesA finite bundle S : Finset α pairwise-dominates a finite bundle S' : Finset α for an agent with weak preference relation le : α → α → Prop…
Read back from the Lean
Given types Agent and Object with [DecidableEq Agent], and an allocation rule f : (Agent → LinearOrder Object) → Agent → Finset Object, is_weakly_strategy_proof_rule f asserts that:
For every preference profile succ : Agent → LinearOrder Object, every agent i : Agent, and every alternative preference order succ'_i : LinearOrder Object for agent i,
it is NOT the case that both:
1. The bundle f (Function.update succ i succ'_i) i pairwise dominates f succ i with respect to agent i's true order (succ i).le, AND
2. The bundle f succ i does NOT pairwise dominate f (Function.update succ i succ'_i) i with respect to (succ i).le.
Written by a model that saw only the Lean, never the English above. If the two disagree, that is worth a challenge.
Lean source view module on GitHub
/-- A social choice rule is weakly strategy-proof if no agent can strictly improve her bundle under pairwise dominance by unilaterally misreporting her preference order. -/ def is_weakly_strategy_proof_rule {Agent Object : Type*} [DecidableEq Agent] (f : (Agent → LinearOrder Object) → Agent → Finset Object) : Prop := ∀ (succ : Agent → LinearOrder Object) (i : Agent) (succ'_i : LinearOrder Object), ¬ (pairwise_dominates (succ i).le (f (Function.update succ i succ'_i) i) (f succ i) ∧ ¬ pairwise_dominates (succ i).le (f succ i) (f (Function.update succ i succ'_i) i))