is_ex_post_safe_procurement_for
def
A procurement mechanism is ex-post safe for an agent of cost c if some bidding strategy guarantees nonnegative utility against all other bids and strictly positive utility against some.
Statement
def is_ex_post_safe_procurement_for (alloc pay : List ℝ → ℕ → ℝ) (c : ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 2 (Def. 1 utilities, Def. 3 PNE, Def. 4 Sybil-proof, Def. 5 ex-post safe), complete-information procurement of one divisible unit of work; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-03
- Verified
- 03 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- procurement_agent_utilityThe utility of an agent with cost c who submits the bids
mine(one per identity) while all other identities bidothers: the sum over…
- procurement_agent_utilityThe utility of an agent with cost c who submits the bids
- Used by 3
- proportional_share_no_pne_of_safe_all_costsIf a proportional-share mechanism is ex-post safe for every nonnegative cost, then no profile with at least one agent and nonnegative…
- exists_sybil_proof_ex_post_safe_non_winner_take_all_procurementThere is a procurement mechanism that is Sybil-proof, ex-post safe for all costs at most 1, whose pure Nash equilibria (for costs at most…
- stake_share_ex_post_safeWith K > 0 and M > 0, the stake-share mechanism is ex-post safe for every agent whose cost is at most L.
Lean source view module on GitHub
def is_ex_post_safe_procurement_for (alloc pay : List ℝ → ℕ → ℝ) (c : ℝ) : Prop := ∃ mine : List ℝ, (∀ b ∈ mine, 0 ≤ b) ∧ (∀ others : List ℝ, (∀ x ∈ others, 0 ≤ x) → 0 ≤ procurement_agent_utility alloc pay c mine others) ∧ ∃ others : List ℝ, (∀ x ∈ others, 0 ≤ x) ∧ 0 < procurement_agent_utility alloc pay c mine others