AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

is_sybil_proof_procurement

def

A procurement mechanism is Sybil-proof if, for every cost and every multi-bid strategy, some single bid does at least as well against every profile of other bids.

Statement

def is_sybil_proof_procurement (alloc pay : List ℝ → ℕ → ℝ) : Prop
Defined in
arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 2 (Def. 1 utilities, Def. 3 PNE, Def. 4 Sybil-proof, Def. 5 ex-post safe), complete-information procurement of one divisible unit of work; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-03
Verified
03 Oct 2026
Axioms
none listed
Built on 1
  • procurement_agent_utilityThe utility of an agent with cost c who submits the bids mine (one per identity) while all other identities bid others: the sum over…
Used by 2

Lean source view module on GitHub

def is_sybil_proof_procurement (alloc pay : List ℝ → ℕ → ℝ) : Prop :=
  ∀ (c : ℝ), 0 ≤ c → ∀ mine : List ℝ, (∀ b ∈ mine, 0 ≤ b) →
    ∃ b : ℝ, 0 ≤ b ∧ ∀ others : List ℝ, (∀ x ∈ others, 0 ≤ x) →
      procurement_agent_utility alloc pay c mine others ≤
        procurement_agent_utility alloc pay c [b] others
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