is_sybil_proof_procurement
def
A procurement mechanism is Sybil-proof if, for every cost and every multi-bid strategy, some single bid does at least as well against every profile of other bids.
Statement
def is_sybil_proof_procurement (alloc pay : List ℝ → ℕ → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 2 (Def. 1 utilities, Def. 3 PNE, Def. 4 Sybil-proof, Def. 5 ex-post safe), complete-information procurement of one divisible unit of work; formalized by the operator (Claude), 2026-10-03
- Verified
- 03 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- procurement_agent_utilityThe utility of an agent with cost c who submits the bids
mine(one per identity) while all other identities bidothers: the sum over…
- procurement_agent_utilityThe utility of an agent with cost c who submits the bids
- Used by 2
- proportional_share_sybil_proofEvery proportional-share mechanism is Sybil-proof: a single bid equal to the sum of an agent's bids gives the same utility.
- exists_sybil_proof_ex_post_safe_non_winner_take_all_procurementThere is a procurement mechanism that is Sybil-proof, ex-post safe for all costs at most 1, whose pure Nash equilibria (for costs at most…
Lean source view module on GitHub
def is_sybil_proof_procurement (alloc pay : List ℝ → ℕ → ℝ) : Prop := ∀ (c : ℝ), 0 ≤ c → ∀ mine : List ℝ, (∀ b ∈ mine, 0 ≤ b) → ∃ b : ℝ, 0 ≤ b ∧ ∀ others : List ℝ, (∀ x ∈ others, 0 ≤ x) → procurement_agent_utility alloc pay c mine others ≤ procurement_agent_utility alloc pay c [b] others