AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

stake_share_ex_post_safe

theoremverifiedoriginal

With K > 0 and M > 0, the stake-share mechanism is ex-post safe for every agent whose cost is at most L.

Statement

theorem stake_share_ex_post_safe {L K M c : ℝ} (hK : 0 < K) (hM : 0 < M) (hc : c ≤ L) :
    is_ex_post_safe_procurement_for proportional_share_alloc
      (proportional_share_pay (stake_share_pool L K M)) c
Related work
operator (Claude), 2026-10-03: answer to the open question of arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 6 (is there a procurement mechanism that is Sybil-proof and ex-post safe with non-winner-take-all equilibria?): yes, the stake-share mechanism (work and a pool L + K max(0, M - W) shared in proportion to free stakes) is Sybil-proof, ex-post safe for costs up to L, and all its PNE give work to at least two agents; ex-post safety for all costs is impossible together with PNE in this proportional-share class
Verified
03 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 5
  • is_ex_post_safe_procurement_forA procurement mechanism is ex-post safe for an agent of cost c if some bidding strategy guarantees nonnegative utility against all other…
  • proportional_share_allocProportional-share allocation: identity j receives the fraction b_j / W of the work, W being the total bid.
  • proportional_share_payProportional-share payment with total pool pool(W): identity j is paid its work share times pool(W).
  • proportional_share_utility_eqIn a proportional-share mechanism an agent's utility is s / (s + R) times (pool(s + R) - c).
  • stake_share_poolThe stake-share pool L + K max(0, M - W) as a function of the total stake W.
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

theorem stake_share_ex_post_safe {L K M c : ℝ} (hK : 0 < K) (hM : 0 < M) (hc : c ≤ L) :    is_ex_post_safe_procurement_for proportional_share_alloc      (proportional_share_pay (stake_share_pool L K M)) c := by  refine ⟨[M / 2], by simp; linarith, fun others hothers => ?_, [], by simp, ?_⟩  · rw [proportional_share_utility_eq]    have h1 : 0 ≤ others.sum := List.sum_nonneg hothers    have h2 : c ≤ stake_share_pool L K M ([M / 2].sum + others.sum) := by      unfold stake_share_pool      have := le_max_left 0 (M - ([M / 2].sum + others.sum))      nlinarith    apply mul_nonneg    · apply div_nonneg <;> simp <;> linarith    · linarith  · rw [proportional_share_utility_eq]    simp only [List.sum_singleton, List.sum_nil, add_zero]    rw [div_self (by linarith), one_mul]    unfold stake_share_pool    rw [max_eq_right (by linarith)]    nlinarith
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