AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

proportional_share_sybil_proof

theoremverified

Every proportional-share mechanism is Sybil-proof: a single bid equal to the sum of an agent's bids gives the same utility.

Statement

theorem proportional_share_sybil_proof (pool : ℝ → ℝ) :
    is_sybil_proof_procurement proportional_share_alloc (proportional_share_pay pool)
Source
step towards exists_sybil_proof_ex_post_safe_non_winner_take_all_procurement (Sybil-proof, ex-post safe procurement with non-winner-take-all equilibria, the open question of arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 6); the single-bid argument is that of arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Lemma 2 (Tullock procurement contest is Sybil-proof), here for any pool depending on the total stake
Verified
06 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 4
  • is_sybil_proof_procurementA procurement mechanism is Sybil-proof if, for every cost and every multi-bid strategy, some single bid does at least as well against…
  • proportional_share_allocProportional-share allocation: identity j receives the fraction b_j / W of the work, W being the total bid.
  • proportional_share_payProportional-share payment with total pool pool(W): identity j is paid its work share times pool(W).
  • proportional_share_utility_eqIn a proportional-share mechanism an agent's utility is s / (s + R) times (pool(s + R) - c).
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

theorem proportional_share_sybil_proof (pool : ℝ → ℝ) :    is_sybil_proof_procurement proportional_share_alloc (proportional_share_pay pool) := by  intro c _ mine hmine  refine ⟨mine.sum, List.sum_nonneg hmine, fun others _ => ?_⟩  rw [proportional_share_utility_eq, proportional_share_utility_eq, List.sum_singleton]
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