stake_share_pool
deforiginal
The stake-share pool L + K max(0, M - W) as a function of the total stake W.
Statement
noncomputable def stake_share_pool (L K M W : ℝ) : ℝ
- Related work
- operator (Claude), 2026-10-03: answer to the open question of arXiv:2603.27779 v1, Sec. 6 (is there a procurement mechanism that is Sybil-proof and ex-post safe with non-winner-take-all equilibria?): yes, the stake-share mechanism (work and a pool L + K max(0, M - W) shared in proportion to free stakes) is Sybil-proof, ex-post safe for costs up to L, and all its PNE give work to at least two agents; ex-post safety for all costs is impossible together with PNE in this proportional-share class
- Verified
- 03 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Used by 6
- exists_sybil_proof_ex_post_safe_non_winner_take_all_procurementThere is a procurement mechanism that is Sybil-proof, ex-post safe for all costs at most 1, whose pure Nash equilibria (for costs at most…
- stake_share_pne_exists_and_non_winner_take_allFor n >= 2 agents with costs in [0, L] and K M >= 3 n^2 L, the stake-share mechanism has a pure Nash equilibrium, and every pure Nash…
- stake_share_pne_existsFor n >= 2 agents with costs in [0, L], if K M >= 3 n^2 L then the stake-share mechanism has a pure Nash equilibrium (each agent…
- stake_share_pne_non_winner_take_allIn the stake-share mechanism with K, M > 0 and all costs at most L, every pure Nash equilibrium (with at least one agent) gives positive…
- stake_share_two_agent_pneWith pool 1 + max(0, 2 - W) and costs 1/5 and 9/10, the stakes 24/35 and 18/35 form a pure Nash equilibrium.
- stake_share_ex_post_safeWith K > 0 and M > 0, the stake-share mechanism is ex-post safe for every agent whose cost is at most L.
Lean source view module on GitHub
noncomputable def stake_share_pool (L K M W : ℝ) : ℝ := L + K * max 0 (M - W)