Auction.FirstPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gt
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
Auction.FirstPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gt
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in omit [DecidableEq I] [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.FirstPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gt {b : I → U} (i : I) (h : ∀ j, j ≠ i → b j < b i) : i = winner b
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.FirstPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gt`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.FirstPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gt← Auction.FirstPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gt (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/FirstPrice.lean:73): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- Auction.FirstPrice.winnerThe winner of the first-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom… - Auction.eq_argmaxBid_of_strict_maxIf
istrictly outbids all others, theniis the argmax bidder.
- Auction.FirstPrice.winnerThe winner of the first-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
- Used by 1
- Auction.FirstPrice.no_dominant_strategyNo dominant strategy exists in first-price auctions. For any bidder
iand any bidbi, there exists a profile where biddingbiis…
- Auction.FirstPrice.no_dominant_strategyNo dominant strategy exists in first-price auctions. For any bidder
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in omit [DecidableEq I] [AddCommGroup U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in lemma Auction.FirstPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gt {b : I → U} (i : I) (h : ∀ j, j ≠ i → b j < b i) : i = winner b := Auction.eq_argmaxBid_of_strict_max b i h