Auction.FirstPrice.utility
defimported Lean
Utility of bidder i in a first-price auction: winner gets v i − b i (pays own bid), losers get 0.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in noncomputable def Auction.FirstPrice.utility (v b : I → U) (i : I) : U
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Auction.FirstPrice.utility`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.FirstPrice.utility← Auction.FirstPrice.utility (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/FirstPrice.lean:79): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- Auction.FirstPrice.winnerThe winner of the first-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom…
- Auction.FirstPrice.winnerThe winner of the first-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
- Used by 5
- Auction.FirstPrice.gameFirst-price auction as a strategic game. This is also the game induced by
mechanismviaMechanismWithTransfers.toStrategicGame; see… - Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
game vequals the strategic game induced bymechanism. The payoffs agree becausepaymentRule b i = if i = winner b then b i else 0,… - Auction.FirstPrice.utility_winnerIf
iis the winner, utility isv i − b i. - Auction.FirstPrice.utility_loserIf
iis not the winner, utility is0. - Auction.FirstPrice.no_dominant_strategyNo dominant strategy exists in first-price auctions. For any bidder
iand any bidbi, there exists a profile where biddingbiis…
- Auction.FirstPrice.gameFirst-price auction as a strategic game. This is also the game induced by
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in /-- Utility of bidder `i` in a first-price auction: winner gets `v i − b i` (pays own bid), losers get `0`. -/ noncomputable def Auction.FirstPrice.utility (v b : I → U) (i : I) : U := if i = winner b then v i - b i else 0