Auction.FirstPrice.winner
defimported Lean
The winner of the first-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses Auction.argmaxBid from MechanismDesign.Auction.AuctionBasic.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in noncomputable def Auction.FirstPrice.winner (b : I → U) : I
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Auction.FirstPrice.winner`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.FirstPrice.winner← Auction.FirstPrice.winner (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/FirstPrice.lean:68): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 1
- Auction.argmaxBidThe bidder whose bid achieves the maximum. This is a mathematical argmax, not a declaration that any auction's winner is the highest…
- Used by 7
- Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
game vequals the strategic game induced bymechanism. The payoffs agree becausepaymentRule b i = if i = winner b then b i else 0,… - Auction.FirstPrice.mechanismThe first-price auction as a
MechanismWithTransfers. Agents report bids inU(their type space is homogeneous:T i = U). -… - Auction.FirstPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gtAuction.FirstPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gt
- Auction.FirstPrice.utility_winnerIf
iis the winner, utility isv i − b i. - Auction.FirstPrice.utility_loserIf
iis not the winner, utility is0. - Auction.FirstPrice.no_dominant_strategyNo dominant strategy exists in first-price auctions. For any bidder
iand any bidbi, there exists a profile where biddingbiis… - Auction.FirstPrice.utilityUtility of bidder
iin a first-price auction: winner getsv i − b i(pays own bid), losers get0.
- Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] in variable {U : Type*} [AddCommGroup U] [LinearOrder U] [IsOrderedAddMonoid U] in /-- The winner of the first-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses `Auction.argmaxBid` from `MechanismDesign.Auction.AuctionBasic`. -/ noncomputable def Auction.FirstPrice.winner (b : I → U) : I := Auction.argmaxBid b