Auction.eq_argmaxBid_of_strict_max
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
If i strictly outbids all others, then i is the argmax bidder.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] {V : Type*} [LinearOrder V] in variable (b : I → V) in lemma Auction.eq_argmaxBid_of_strict_max (i : I) (h : ∀ j, j ≠ i → b j < b i) : i = argmaxBid b
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `Auction.eq_argmaxBid_of_strict_max`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.eq_argmaxBid_of_strict_max← Auction.eq_argmaxBid_of_strict_max (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/AuctionBasic.lean:225): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 2
- Auction.bid_le_maxBidEvery bid is at most the argmax bidder's bid.
- Auction.argmaxBidThe bidder whose bid achieves the maximum. This is a mathematical argmax, not a declaration that any auction's winner is the highest…
- Used by 3
- Auction.SecondPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gtAuction.SecondPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gt
- Auction.FirstPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gtAuction.FirstPrice.eq_winner_of_bid_gt
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true invariable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] {V : Type*} [LinearOrder V] invariable (b : I → V) in/-- If `i` strictly outbids all others, then `i` is the argmax bidder. -/lemma Auction.eq_argmaxBid_of_strict_max (i : I) (h : ∀ j, j ≠ i → b j < b i) : i = argmaxBid b := by contrapose! h exact ⟨argmaxBid b, h.symm, bid_le_maxBid b i⟩