BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in lemma BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hA : A.IsRegular) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) {r s : ℝ} (hrs : r ≤ s) (hwinner : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (Function.update b i r) = i) : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (Function.update b i s) = i
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner← BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:1124): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 32
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularRegularity: every bidder's virtual value is monotone.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_self_mono_of_isRegularBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_self_mono_of_isRegular
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinnerThe virtual-value winner with deterministic tie-breaking.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_neBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_ne
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScoreLexicographic score used to break ties among virtual values.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValueMyerson virtual value
v - (1 - F_i(v)) / f_i(v)for bidderi. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- Auction.argmaxBidThe bidder whose bid achieves the maximum. This is a mathematical argmax, not a declaration that any auction's winner is the highest…
- Auction.bid_le_maxBidEvery bid is at most the argmax bidder's bid.
- Auction.eq_argmaxBid_of_strict_maxIf
istrictly outbids all others, theniis the argmax bidder. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegularUnder regularity, the deterministic virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is monotone in the sense required by…
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set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} inlemma BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hA : A.IsRegular) (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) {r s : ℝ} (hrs : r ≤ s) (hwinner : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (Function.update b i r) = i) : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (Function.update b i s) = i := by classical let bLo := Function.update b i r let bHi := Function.update b i s have hstrict : ∀ j, j ≠ i → A.virtualScore bHi j < A.virtualScore bHi i := by intro j hji have hwinner' : Auction.argmaxBid (A.virtualScore bLo) = i := by simpa [virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner, bLo] using hwinner have hle_lo : A.virtualScore bLo j ≤ A.virtualScore bLo i := by simpa [hwinner'] using Auction.bid_le_maxBid (A.virtualScore bLo) j have hne_lo : A.virtualScore bLo j ≠ A.virtualScore bLo i := by intro h exact hji (Prod.ext_iff.mp (toLex_inj.mp h)).2 have hlt_lo : A.virtualScore bLo j < A.virtualScore bLo i := lt_of_le_of_ne hle_lo hne_lo have hle_self : A.virtualScore bLo i ≤ A.virtualScore bHi i := by simpa [bLo, bHi] using A.virtualScore_update_self_mono_of_isRegular hA b i hrs have hlt_hi : A.virtualScore bLo j < A.virtualScore bHi i := lt_of_lt_of_le hlt_lo hle_self simpa [bLo, bHi, virtualScore_update_ne A b hji s, virtualScore_update_ne A b hji r] using hlt_hi exact (Auction.eq_argmaxBid_of_strict_max (A.virtualScore bHi) i hstrict).symm