AFTD Auto-Formalizing Theoretical Domains

BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner

theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean

BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner

Statement

set_option autoImplicit true in
set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in
open BayesianSingleItemAuction in
open scoped BigOperators in
open MeasureTheory in
variable {I : Type*} in
lemma BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner
    [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I]
    (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hA : A.IsRegular)
    (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) {r s : ℝ} (hrs : r ≤ s)
    (hwinner : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (Function.update b i r) = i) :
    A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (Function.update b i s) = i
Formalizes
EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner`
Lean proof
By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at 1a88f809b538 (Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.
Verified
08 Oct 2026
Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext
Built on 32
Used by 1

Lean source view module on GitHub

set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} inlemma BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner    [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] [DecidableEq I] [LinearOrder I]    (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (hA : A.IsRegular)    (b : I → ℝ) (i : I) {r s : ℝ} (hrs : r ≤ s)    (hwinner : A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (Function.update b i r) = i) :    A.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner (Function.update b i s) = i := by  classical  let bLo := Function.update b i r  let bHi := Function.update b i s  have hstrict : ∀ j, j ≠ i → A.virtualScore bHi j < A.virtualScore bHi i := by    intro j hji    have hwinner' : Auction.argmaxBid (A.virtualScore bLo) = i := by      simpa [virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner, bLo] using hwinner    have hle_lo :        A.virtualScore bLo j ≤ A.virtualScore bLo i := by      simpa [hwinner'] using        Auction.bid_le_maxBid (A.virtualScore bLo) j    have hne_lo : A.virtualScore bLo j ≠ A.virtualScore bLo i := by      intro h      exact hji (Prod.ext_iff.mp (toLex_inj.mp h)).2    have hlt_lo : A.virtualScore bLo j < A.virtualScore bLo i :=      lt_of_le_of_ne hle_lo hne_lo    have hle_self : A.virtualScore bLo i ≤ A.virtualScore bHi i := by      simpa [bLo, bHi] using        A.virtualScore_update_self_mono_of_isRegular hA b i hrs    have hlt_hi : A.virtualScore bLo j < A.virtualScore bHi i :=      lt_of_lt_of_le hlt_lo hle_self    simpa [bLo, bHi, virtualScore_update_ne A b hji s,      virtualScore_update_ne A b hji r] using hlt_hi  exact (Auction.eq_argmaxBid_of_strict_max (A.virtualScore bHi) i hstrict).symm
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