Auction.argmaxBid
defimported Lean
The bidder whose bid achieves the maximum. This is a mathematical argmax, not a declaration that any auction's winner is the highest bidder. Concrete auctions define their own allocation/winner rules.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] {V : Type*} [LinearOrder V] in variable (b : I → V) in noncomputable def Auction.argmaxBid : I
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `Auction.argmaxBid`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.Auction.argmaxBid← Auction.argmaxBid (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/AuctionBasic.lean:213): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 2
- Auction.maxBidThe highest bid in a profile.
- Auction.exists_maxBidThere exists a bidder whose bid equals the highest bid.
- Used by 12
- Auction.bid_le_maxBidEvery bid is at most the argmax bidder's bid.
- Auction.SecondPrice.secondPrice_le_bid_winnerThe winner's bid is at least the second price.
- Auction.FirstPrice.game_eq_toStrategicGame
game vequals the strategic game induced bymechanism. The payoffs agree becausepaymentRule b i = if i = winner b then b i else 0,… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinnerThe virtual-value winner with deterministic tie-breaking.
- Auction.FirstPrice.winnerThe winner of the first-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom… - Auction.maxBidExcluding_le_argmaxBid_bidThe argmax bidder's bid is at least the highest bid among all others.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner
- Auction.maxBidExcluding_eq_maxBid_of_not_argmaxIf
iis not the argmax bidder, excludingidoes not change the highest bid. - Auction.argmaxBid_eq_maxBidThe argmax bidder's bid equals the highest bid.
- Auction.SecondPrice.winnerThe winner of the second-price auction: the bidder with the highest bid. Uses
Auction.argmaxBidfrom… - Auction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_selfAuction.ReserveSecondPrice.bid_le_clearing_threshold_of_not_allocation_update_self
- Auction.eq_argmaxBid_of_strict_maxIf
istrictly outbids all others, theniis the argmax bidder.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in variable {I : Type*} [Fintype I] [Nontrivial I] {V : Type*} [LinearOrder V] in variable (b : I → V) in /-- The bidder whose bid achieves the maximum. This is a mathematical argmax, not a declaration that any auction's winner is the highest bidder. Concrete auctions define their own allocation/winner rules. -/ noncomputable def Auction.argmaxBid : I := Classical.choose (exists_maxBid b)