BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeDerivative
defimported Lean
Envelope derivative condition.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in def BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeDerivative (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeDerivative`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeDerivative← BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeDerivative (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1256): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 16
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
U_i(t_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
- Used by 5
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_hasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeThe envelope derivative gives the payoff envelope.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_hasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeThe envelope derivative implies the payment identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_hasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeIC plus the envelope derivative gives the payoff envelope.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeDerivative_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_equilibriumPayoff_differentiableIC and differentiability give the envelope derivative.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimEnvelopeFormula_and_paymentFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_hasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeEnvelope and payment identities from IC and the derivative condition.
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Envelope derivative condition. -/ def BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeDerivative (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) : Prop := ∀ (i : I) (v_i : ℝ), HasDerivAt (A.equilibriumPayoff i) (A.interimAllocProb i v_i) v_i