BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in @[simp] theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply (i : I) (v : ℝ) (t : OpponentTypeProfile I i) : (profileSplitMeasurableEquiv i).symm (v, t) = reportProfile i v t
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply← BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:482): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 15
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquivSplit a profile into coordinate
iand its opponents. - OpponentTypeProfileOpponent type profiles for real-valued auction types.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfileThe reported type profile obtained by combining
zᵢwith an opponent profilet₋ᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 247
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
0gives payment0, holding the other reports fixed. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupportNonnegative envelope increments on
[0, ωᵢ]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleEx-ante virtual-surplus optimality of the deterministic rule, conditional on the explicit integrability assumptions needed by the Bochner…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_winningVirtualValueBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_winningVirtualValue
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectationInterim expectation of a full-profile observable after report
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanismBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toSingleParameterMechanism
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupportInterim individual rationality on
[0, ωᵢ]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_nonpos_of_forall_lt_reserveThresholdIf all reports are below reserve, the winning virtual value is nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsOnTypeSupportAgent
i's type lies in[0, ωᵢ]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasEnvelopeVirtualSurplusUpperBoundEnvelope-term revenue is bounded by interim virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_pos_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupport_of_profileInteriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_pos_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupport_of_profileInterior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_ennreal_ofReal_aemeasurableBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_ennreal_ofReal_aemeasurable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue_nonpos_of_lt_isReserveThresholdBelow a reserve threshold, the virtual value is nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurable_of_boundA.e. strong measurability and bounds imply interim integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongRevenueComparableRevenue optimality among revenue-comparable candidates.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuctionRegular Myerson optimality among feasible IC/IR mechanisms.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_iff_interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos[MSZ 12.52] Supportwise IR iff zero-type payment is nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_interim_virtual_surplus_density_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_interim_virtual_surplus_density_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.integrableVirtualSurplusBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.integrableVirtualSurplus
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentityEx-ante virtual surplus agrees with the interim expression.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winningVirtualValue_pos_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winningVirtualValue_pos_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeProfileSupport_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeProfileSupport_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoffTruthful interim payoff
U_i(t_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue_pos_of_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_oneA bidder allocated probability
1has positive virtual value. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible[MSZ 12.147] Payment identity from IC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntegrableInterimPayment_of_aestronglyMeasurable_of_boundBounded a.e. strongly measurable payment integrands are integrable.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toInterimFubiniBayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toInterimFubini
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueUpperBounded_of_isRevenueComparableBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueUpperBounded_of_isRevenueComparable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleAllocates to the highest positive virtual value, otherwise withholds the item.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_isAllocFeasibleThe virtual-surplus-maximizing mechanism is allocation-feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasPositiveDensityOnSupportDensities are positive on support interiors.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentityEx-ante revenue agrees with the interim-payment expression.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_hasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeThe envelope derivative gives the payoff envelope.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_of_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toPaymentInterimFubiniBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.toPaymentInterimFubini
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimPaymentFormula[MSZ 12.49] Payment identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasMyersonPaymentRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentityMyerson-payment revenue equals expected virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplusEx-ante expected virtual surplus under the auction prior.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_eq_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_interimAllocProb_eqSame
q_iand zero-type payment give the same truthful payoff. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeSupport_rightBayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeSupport_right
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_hasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeThe envelope derivative implies the payment identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtility_eq_equilibriumPayoff_addMisreport utility in terms of truthful payoff at the report.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularRegularity: every bidder's virtual value is monotone.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_of_forall_virtualSurplus_lePointwise virtual-surplus dominance lifts to ex-ante dominance.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isReserveThreshold_of_isRegular_of_virtualValue_eq_zeroA zero of a regular virtual value is a reserve threshold.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptionsCDF assumptions for the interim virtual-surplus comparison.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_totalAllocation_mul_winningVirtualValueBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_totalAllocation_mul_winningVirtualValue
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasIntegrableInterimPaymentPayment integrands are integrable.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_self_mono_of_isRegularBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_self_mono_of_isRegular
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironmentExpected seller revenue of
B, evaluated in environmentA. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mono_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC implies monotonicity of
q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrandQuasi-linear utility integrand.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_zeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_zeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusUpperBoundInterim-payment revenue is bounded by interim virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_eq_integral_interimPaymentIntegrandThe generic interim expectation specializes to the payment integrand.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.norm_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_leThe constructed Myerson payment is bounded by twice the absolute report. This uses only the pointwise allocation bounds
0 ≤ x ≤ 1; it is… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentInterimFubiniAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubiniBuild payment-side interim Fubini hypotheses from type-measure Fubini.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_envelope_upperBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_envelope_upper
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentityBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasIntegrableInterimObjectsAllocation and payment integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_forall_virtualValue_nonposIf all virtual values are nonpositive, withhold the item.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasIntervalIntegrableInterimAllocationGlobal interval integrability of
q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_iffAllocation probability
1characterizes the positive virtual-value winner. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProbInterim allocation probability
q_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValueThe virtual value attained by the selected virtual-value winner.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isFeasibleThe constructed auction is feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_interim_identitiesBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_interim_identities
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eqBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_eq
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_isFeasible_of_aestronglyMeasurableFeasibility and a.e. strong measurability imply allocation integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_of_expectedVirtualSurplus_leVirtual-surplus comparison gives revenue comparison under identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_max_winningVirtualValue_zeroThe constructed virtual surplus is the positive part of the winning virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeProfileInterior_isOnTypeProfileSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeProfileInterior_isOnTypeProfileSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_winner_eq_one_of_winningVirtualValue_posIf the winning virtual value is positive, the selected winner receives
1. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRulePointwise virtual-surplus maximality.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasIntegrableInterimAllocationAllocation integrands are integrable.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.survivalIntegral_eq_accumulatedDensityBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.survivalIntegral_eq_accumulatedDensity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinnerThe virtual-value winner with deterministic tie-breaking.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormulaBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_winnerIndicator_of_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_winnerIndicator_of_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasEnvelopeVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_analyticAssumptionsBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasEnvelopeVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_analyticAssumptions
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_toDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfers
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimPaymentIntegrand_boundFor each fixed report, the constructed Myerson payment integrand is bounded uniformly over opponent profiles.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPaymentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_eq_withMyersonPayment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_paymentRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntervalIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC gives global interval integrability of
q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasIntegrableInterimObjects_of_aestronglyMeasurableOnce the constructed allocation and payment integrands are measurable, boundedness gives interim integrability for the constructed auction.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_ne_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_ne_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_eq_iff_forall_virtualScore_leThe selected winner is exactly the bidder whose lexicographic virtual score dominates every other bidder's score.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualScore_le_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualScore_le_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_nonneg_of_hasNonnegativeDensityOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_nonneg_of_hasNonnegativeDensityOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_allocation_survival_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBoundThe envelope-term upper bound for interim expected payments.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanismThe virtual-surplus allocation rule paired with its Myerson payment.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_of_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_of_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsOnTypeProfileSupportA type profile lies in the product support.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasIntervalIntegrableInterimAllocationOnSupportSupportwise interval integrability of
q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_hasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeIC plus the envelope derivative gives the payoff envelope.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeSupport_leftBayesianSingleItemAuction.isOnTypeSupport_left
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormulaBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_zeroNormalized_of_interimPaymentFormula
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_nonnegBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_nonneg
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimEnvelopeFormula_and_paymentFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible[MSZ 12.49] Envelope and payment identities from IC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_nonpos_iff_forall_virtualValue_nonposThe winning virtual value is nonpositive iff all virtual values are.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedInterimVirtualSurplusEx-ante virtual surplus through interim allocation probabilities.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueUpperBoundedBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueUpperBounded
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptionsFubini hypotheses connecting ex-ante and interim expressions.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_not_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_le_alloc_mul_sub_integral_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportIC and IR bound interim expected payment by the envelope term.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasIntegrableInterimAllocation_of_aestronglyMeasurable_of_boundBounded a.e. strongly measurable allocation integrands are integrable.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_neBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScore_update_ne
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identitiesBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_interim_identities
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_le_of_isDSICPointwise DSIC inequality for the interim utility integrand.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportSupportwise IR makes zero-type expected payment nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.exists_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_iff_exists_virtualValue_posA sale occurs exactly when some bidder has positive virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isMonotone_of_isRegularUnder regularity, the deterministic virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is monotone in the sense required by…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.exists_reserveThreshold_le_bid_of_exists_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_oneIf a sale occurs, some bidder reaches her reserve threshold.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_update_self_of_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible[MSZ 12.49] Payoff envelope from IC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsOnTypeProfileInteriorA profile lies in the interior of the product support.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.aestronglyMeasurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimAllocationIntegrandBayesianSingleItemAuction.aestronglyMeasurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_interimAllocationIntegrand
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormulaThe payoff envelope implies the payment identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_nonnegative_ae_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_nonnegative_ae_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mem_Icc_of_isFeasibleFeasible interim allocation probabilities lie in
[0, 1]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reserveThreshold_le_bid_of_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_oneAn allocated bidder reports at least her reserve threshold.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula[MSZ 12.49] Payoff envelope.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueComparableBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isRevenueComparable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasNonnegativeDensityOnSupportDensities are nonnegative on supports.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBoundExpected revenue is bounded above by expected virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualScoreLexicographic score used to break ties among virtual values.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_le_one_of_isFeasibleFeasible auctions have interim allocation probabilities at most
1. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.accumulatedAllocation_density_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.accumulatedAllocation_density_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.integral_interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrand_eqThe utility integrand integrates to interim utility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBoundedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_revenueUpperBounded
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_of_isZeroNormalizedA zero-normalized payment rule has zero interim expected payment at type
0. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityInterim utility
q_i(z_i) * t_i - m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedPaymentRevenueInEnvironmentExpected total payment revenue under the base prior.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isSingleItemAllocationRuleThe virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is feasible.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_eq_neg_interimExpectedPayment_zero_add_integral[MSZ 12.146] Payoff identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_identityBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusUpperBound_of_identity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_winner_eq_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatibleInterim incentive compatibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_opponentPrior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_comp_of_measurable_virtualValuesBayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_comp_of_measurable_virtualValues
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIndividuallyRationalInterim individual rationality.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_nonpos_of_winningVirtualValue_nonposBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplus_nonpos_of_winningVirtualValue_nonpos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.deriv_equilibriumPayoff_eq_interimAllocProb_of_isIncentiveCompatibleAt differentiable types,
U_i' = q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimPaymentIntegrandPayment integrand for interim payment.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocationIntegrandAllocation integrand for interim probability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValueMyerson virtual value
v - (1 - F_i(v)) / f_i(v)for bidderi. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_iff_forall_virtualValue_nonposWithholding is equivalent to all virtual values being nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelope_density_integrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelope_density_integrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_pos_iff_exists_virtualValue_posThe winning virtual value is positive iff some virtual value is positive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_respectsSingleItemCapacityBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_respectsSingleItemCapacity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reserveThreshold_le_winner_bid_of_winningVirtualValue_posA positive virtual-value winner reaches her reserve threshold.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_convexOn_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC makes truthful payoff convex.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeDerivative_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_equilibriumPayoff_differentiableIC and differentiability give the envelope derivative.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_winnerIndicator_of_winningVirtualValue_posIf the winning virtual value is positive, allocate to the selected winner.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.integrable_interimQuasiLinearUtilityIntegrandUtility integrability from allocation and payment integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualValue_nonneg_of_isReserveThresholdAt a reserve threshold, the virtual value is nonnegative.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.intervalIntegrable_interimAllocProb_mul_virtualValue_mul_typeDensity_of_profileSplit_integrableProduct-side virtual-surplus integrability gives interval integrability of the density-weighted interim virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_pointwiseBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_pointwise
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuctionBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.isRevenueComparable_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.interim_allocation_intervalIntegrableOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.interim_allocation_intervalIntegrableOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.exists_reserveThreshold_le_bid_of_winningVirtualValue_posPositive winning virtual value implies some report reaches reserve.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_iff_winningVirtualValue_nonposWithholding is equivalent to nonpositive winning virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedInterimPaymentRevenueEx-ante revenue through interim expected payments.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_of_isZeroNormalized_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormulaUnder the interim envelope formula and nonnegative envelope increments, zero normalization implies support-restricted interim IR.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrableBayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.expectedPaymentRevenueIntegrable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimEnvelopeFormula_and_paymentFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_hasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeEnvelope and payment identities from IC and the derivative condition.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.TypeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptionsType-measure Fubini hypotheses.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_of_isDSICDSIC implies interim IC under interim integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_zero_of_forall_lt_reserveThresholdIf all reports are below reserve thresholds, withhold the item.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_eq_and_equilibriumPayoff_eq_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula[MSZ 12.50] Same
q_iand zero-type payment give the same interim objects. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentEnvelopeUpperBound_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_pos_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_pos_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubiniBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeMeasureInterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions_of_typeMeasure_fubini
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptionsAnalytic assumptions for MSZ 12.59.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasNonnegativeInterimAllocationIntegralOnSupport_of_isFeasibleFeasibility gives nonnegative envelope increments on the support.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_myersonPayment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.hasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentity_of_myersonPaymentIdentity_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.existsUnique_zeroNormalized_paymentRule_for_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IntegrableVirtualSurplusIntegrability condition for ex-ante virtual surplus under the auction prior.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasExpectedRevenueVirtualSurplusIdentityExpected revenue equals expected virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.typeDensity_nonnegative_aeBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.typeDensity_nonnegative_ae
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_eq_integral_interimAllocationIntegrandThe generic interim expectation specializes to the allocation integrand.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.measurable_virtualValue_of_isRegularRegular virtual values are measurable by Mathlib's measurability theorem for monotone real functions.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isImplementable_of_isRegularBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isImplementable_of_isRegular
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.paymentRule_eq_virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRule_of_isDSIC_of_zeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.hasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentityBayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptions.hasExpectedRevenueInterimPaymentIdentity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentityBayesianSingleItemAuction.InterimFubiniAnalyticAssumptions.hasExpectedVirtualSurplusInterimIdentity
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.envelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions_of_environmentBayesianSingleItemAuction.envelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions_of_environment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegral_eq_virtualSurplusIntegralBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegral_eq_virtualSurplusIntegral
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_nonneg_of_isFeasibleFeasible auctions have nonnegative interim allocation probabilities.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_le_oneBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_le_one
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusEnvironmentAssumptions.typeDensity_nonnegative_aeBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusEnvironmentAssumptions.typeDensity_nonnegative_ae
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasible.isSingleItemAllocationRuleAuction feasibility gives allocation-rule feasibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_priorBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_prior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironmentMyerson-payment revenue of
B, evaluated in environmentA. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRevenueComparableFeasible candidates with revenue equal to virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeEnvelope derivative condition.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_pos_iff_of_winnerBayesianSingleItemAuction.winningVirtualValue_update_self_pos_iff_of_winner
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.not_forall_lt_reserveThreshold_of_winningVirtualValue_posPositive winning virtual value rules out all reports below reserve.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusEnvironmentAssumptionsEnvironment-level analytic assumptions for the envelope/virtual-surplus comparison.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_of_winner_of_winning_posBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_of_winner_of_winning_pos
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuctionThe Bayesian auction using the virtual-surplus mechanism and the original priors.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.EnvelopeVirtualSurplusAnalyticAssumptions.envelopeIntegrand_eq_onSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_of_isFeasible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRuleThe deterministic virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is feasible and pointwise maximizes virtual surplus among all feasible…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalThe allocation rule of the Myerson-payment mechanism is virtual-surplus optimal. This exposes the optimal-allocation content at the…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingWinner_virtualValue_geThe selected winner has maximal virtual value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedVirtualSurplus_le_virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRuleThe allocation rule of the constructed Bayesian auction is ex-ante virtual-surplus optimal under the same explicit integrability…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge[MSZ 12.48] IC iff the one-dimensional payoff inequality.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.jointDensity_pos_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupport_of_profileInteriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.jointDensity_pos_of_hasPositiveDensityOnSupport_of_profileInterior
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsReserveThresholdA reserve threshold separating nonpositive and nonnegative virtual values.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasPositiveDensityOnSupport.nonzero_on_supportBayesianSingleItemAuction.HasPositiveDensityOnSupport.nonzero_on_support
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRevenueUpperBoundedFeasible candidates with revenue bounded by virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalizedBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_eq_myersonPaymentRevenueInEnvironment_of_isDSIC_of_isZeroNormalized
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironmentBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_hasSameSellingEnvironment
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimal
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongExpected seller-revenue optimality among candidates.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsFeasibleICIRIntegrableFeasible IC/IR candidates with integrable virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.PaymentInterimFubiniAssumptionsPayment-side Fubini hypotheses connecting ex-ante and interim expressions.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusVirtual surplus of an allocation rule at a reported type profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_eq_of_hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_interimAllocProb_eqSame
q_iand zero-type payment give the same interim payment. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingPaymentRuleMyerson payment for
virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRuleFeasible allocation rules that pointwise maximize virtual surplus.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeDataBayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_typeData
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasPositiveJointDensityAtThe joint density is positive at a profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPaymentInterim expected payment
m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.withPayment_isAllocFeasible_of_isSingleItemAllocationRuleA feasible single-item allocation rule satisfies
IsAllocFeasiblewith any payment rule. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalInEnvironmentAmongRevenueUpperBoundedRevenue optimality under the one-sided revenue upper bound.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalThe allocation rule of the constructed Bayesian single-item auction is virtual-surplus optimal.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.exists_virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_eq_one_iff_winningVirtualValue_posA sale occurs exactly when the selected virtual value is positive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_measurableBayesianSingleItemAuction.typeDensity_measurable
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_envelope_analyticBayesianSingleItemAuction.RegularMyersonICIRAnalyticAssumptions.candidate_envelope_analytic
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsZeroNormalizedZero normalization for a Bayesian single-item auction's payment rule: reporting
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in @[simp] theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply (i : I) (v : ℝ) (t : OpponentTypeProfile I i) : (profileSplitMeasurableEquiv i).symm (v, t) = reportProfile i v t := rfl