BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff
defimported Lean
Truthful interim payoff U_i(t_i).
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (i : I) (t_i : ℝ) : ℝ
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff← BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/BayesianSingleItem.lean:1046): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 15
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtilityInterim utility
q_i(z_i) * t_i - m_i(z_i). - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 20
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupportInterim individual rationality on
[0, ωᵢ]. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport_iff_interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos[MSZ 12.52] Supportwise IR iff zero-type payment is nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_hasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeThe envelope derivative gives the payoff envelope.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_eq_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_interimAllocProb_eqSame
q_iand zero-type payment give the same truthful payoff. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimQuasiLinearUtility_eq_equilibriumPayoff_addMisreport utility in terms of truthful payoff at the report.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimAllocProb_mono_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC implies monotonicity of
q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_zero_nonpos_of_isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportSupportwise IR makes zero-type expected payment nonpositive.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeFormula_of_isIncentiveCompatible[MSZ 12.49] Payoff envelope from IC.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimPaymentFormula_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormulaThe payoff envelope implies the payment identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeFormula[MSZ 12.49] Payoff envelope.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_eq_neg_interimExpectedPayment_zero_add_integral[MSZ 12.146] Payoff identity.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIncentiveCompatibleInterim incentive compatibility.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIndividuallyRationalInterim individual rationality.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.deriv_equilibriumPayoff_eq_interimAllocProb_of_isIncentiveCompatibleAt differentiable types,
U_i' = q_i. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff_convexOn_of_isIncentiveCompatibleIC makes truthful payoff convex.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.hasInterimEnvelopeDerivative_of_isIncentiveCompatible_of_equilibriumPayoff_differentiableIC and differentiability give the envelope derivative.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_of_isDSICDSIC implies interim IC under interim integrability.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.interimExpectedPayment_eq_and_equilibriumPayoff_eq_of_hasInterimEnvelopeFormula[MSZ 12.50] Same
q_iand zero-type payment give the same interim objects. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.HasInterimEnvelopeDerivativeEnvelope derivative condition.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.isIncentiveCompatible_iff_equilibriumPayoff_ge[MSZ 12.48] IC iff the one-dimensional payoff inequality.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsIndividuallyRationalOnSupportInterim individual rationality on
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Truthful interim payoff `U_i(t_i)`. -/ noncomputable def BayesianSingleItemAuction.equilibriumPayoff (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (i : I) (t_i : ℝ) : ℝ := A.interimQuasiLinearUtility i t_i t_i