BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule
defimported Lean
Feasible allocation rules that pointwise maximize virtual surplus.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in def BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule [Fintype I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ) : Prop
- Defined in
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule← BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:168): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
- none listed
- Built on 16
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusVirtual surplus of an allocation rule at a reported type profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsSingleItemAllocationRuleA nonnegative fractional allocation rule with total mass at most
1. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 9
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuctionRegular Myerson optimality among feasible IC/IR mechanisms.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isFeasible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatibleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIncentiveCompatible
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAllocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRuleThe deterministic virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is feasible and pointwise maximizes virtual surplus among all feasible…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_allocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalThe allocation rule of the Myerson-payment mechanism is virtual-surplus optimal. This exposes the optimal-allocation content at the…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupportBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isIndividuallyRationalOnSupport
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimalBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isExpectedSellerRevenueOptimal
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingAuction_allocationRule_isVirtualSurplusOptimalThe allocation rule of the constructed Bayesian single-item auction is virtual-surplus optimal.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRuleBayesianSingleItemAuction.IsRegularMyersonOptimalICIRAuction.isVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule
Lean source view module on GitHub
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in /-- Feasible allocation rules that pointwise maximize virtual surplus. -/ def BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsVirtualSurplusOptimalAllocationRule [Fintype I] (A : BayesianSingleItemAuction I) (x : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ) : Prop := IsSingleItemAllocationRule x ∧ ∀ y, IsSingleItemAllocationRule y → ∀ b, A.virtualSurplus y b ≤ A.virtualSurplus x b