BayesianSingleItemAuction.withPayment_isAllocFeasible_of_isSingleItemAllocationRule
theoremverifiedformalizationimported Lean
A feasible single-item allocation rule satisfies IsAllocFeasible with any payment rule.
Statement
set_option autoImplicit true in set_option relaxedAutoImplicit true in open BayesianSingleItemAuction in open scoped BigOperators in open MeasureTheory in variable {I : Type*} in theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.withPayment_isAllocFeasible_of_isSingleItemAllocationRule [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] {x p : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} (hx : IsSingleItemAllocationRule x) : ({ allocationRule := x, paymentRule := p } : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ).IsAllocFeasible
- Formalizes
- EconCSLib, `BayesianSingleItemAuction.withPayment_isAllocFeasible_of_isSingleItemAllocationRule`
- Lean proof
- By xbei (from the file's git history), from github.com/gametheoryinlean/EconCSLib at
1a88f809b538(Copyright (c) 2026 EconCSLib contributors. All rights reserved, Apache-2.0). Compiled here against leanprover/lean4:v4.33.1, Mathlib v4.33.1; written for leanprover/lean4:v4.30.0.BayesianSingleItemAuction.withPayment_isAllocFeasible_of_isSingleItemAllocationRule← BayesianSingleItemAuction.withPayment_isAllocFeasible_of_isSingleItemAllocationRule (EconCSLib/MechanismDesign/Auction/OptimalSingleItem.lean:159): verbatim
- Verified
- 08 Oct 2026
- Axioms
Classical.choiceQuot.soundpropext- Built on 19
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.productPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasureBayesianSingleItemAuction.opponentProductPrior_isProbabilityMeasure
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForallBayesianSingleItemAuction.instCoeDirectBayesianMechanismWithTransfersRealForall
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_sndBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_snd
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_applyBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_symm_apply
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_selfBayesianSingleItemAuction.expectedSellerRevenueInEnvironment_self
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fstBayesianSingleItemAuction.profileSplitMeasurableEquiv_apply_fst
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsSingleItemAllocationRuleA nonnegative fractional allocation rule with total mass at most
1. - SingleParameterMechanism.IsAllocFeasibleAllocation feasibility: each agent's allocation lies in
[0, 1]. RequiresZero R,One R, andLE R(e.g., any linearly ordered field). - SingleParameterMechanismA single-parameter mechanism. Each agent
ihas a single private typeθ_i : R(their "value per unit"). The allocation gives each agent… - MechanismWithTransfersA mechanism with monetary transfers. -
I— agents -T— report/type space of each agent -A— allocation space -P— payment space… - BayesianSingleItemAuction.IsSingleItemAllocationRule.le_oneA feasible single-item allocation gives each bidder probability at most
1. - BayesianSingleItemAuctionA direct Bayesian single-item auction with scalar private types and probabilistic allocation. The allocation rule returns a function…
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_selfThe inserted coordinate is the inserted value.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.profileInsert_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_selfThe inserted coordinate is
zᵢ. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.reportProfile_of_neOther coordinates come from the opponent profile.
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.update_reportProfile_selfUpdating coordinate
ireplaces the inserted report. - BayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPriorBayesianSingleItemAuction.instIsProbabilityMeasureOpponentTypeProfileOpponentPrior
- Used by 1
- BayesianSingleItemAuction.virtualSurplusMaximizingMechanism_isAllocFeasibleThe virtual-surplus-maximizing mechanism is allocation-feasible.
Lean source view module on GitHub
Choose a tactic — a marked line — to see the goals Lean had before and after it, as in Lean’s infoview. Step with ← → or j k.
set_option autoImplicit true inset_option relaxedAutoImplicit true inopen BayesianSingleItemAuction inopen scoped BigOperators inopen MeasureTheory invariable {I : Type*} in/-- A feasible single-item allocation rule satisfies `IsAllocFeasible` with any payment rule. -/theorem BayesianSingleItemAuction.withPayment_isAllocFeasible_of_isSingleItemAllocationRule [Fintype I] [DecidableEq I] {x p : (I → ℝ) → I → ℝ} (hx : IsSingleItemAllocationRule x) : ({ allocationRule := x, paymentRule := p } : SingleParameterMechanism I ℝ).IsAllocFeasible := by intro b i exact ⟨hx.1 b i, hx.le_one b i⟩